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Abstract Large-scale model-driven system engineer-
ing projects are carried out collaboratively. Engineer-
ing artifacts stored in model repositories are devel-
oped in either offline (checkout-modify-commit) or on-
line (GoogleDoc-style) scenarios. Complex systems fre-
quently integrate models and components developed by
different teams, vendors and suppliers. Thus confiden-
tiality and integrity of design artifacts need to be pro-
tected in accordance with access control policies.
We propose a secure collaborative modeling ap-
proach where fine-grained access control for models
is strictly enforced by bidirectional model transforma-
tions. Collaborators obtain filtered local copies of the
model containing only those model elements which they
are allowed to read; write access control policies are
checked on the server upon submitting model changes.
We present a formal collaboration schema which
provenly guarantees certain correctness constraints,
and its adaption to online scenarios with on-the-fly
change propagation and the integration into existing
version control systems to support offline scenarios. The
approach is illustrated and its scalability is evaluated
using a case study of the MONDO EU project.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Collaborative modeling in MDE
The adoption of model driven engineering (MDE) by
system integrators (like airframers or car manufactur-
ers) has been steadily increasing in the recent years [55],
since it enables to detect design flaws early and gener-
ate various artifacts (source code, documentation, con-
figuration tables, etc.) automatically from high-quality
system models.
The use of models also intensifies collaboration
between distributed teams of different stakeholders
(system integrators, software engineers of component
providers/suppliers, hardware engineers, certification
authorities, etc.) via model repositories, which signif-
icantly enhances productivity and reduces time to mar-
ket. An emerging industrial practice of system integra-
tors is to outsource the development of various design
artifacts to subcontractors in an architecture-driven
supply chain.
Collaboration scenarios include traditional offline
collaborations with asynchronous long transactions (i.e.
to check out an artifact from a version control system
and commit local changes afterwards) as well as on-
line collaborations with short and synchronous transac-
tions (e.g. when a group of collaborators simultaneously
edit a model, similarly to well-known on-line document
/ spreadsheet editors). Several collaborative modeling
frameworks (like CDO [49], EMFStore [50], etc.) exist
to support such scenarios.
However, such collaborative scenarios introduce sig-
nificant challenges for security management in order to
protect the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) of dif-
ferent parties. For instance, the detailed internal design
of a specific component needs to be hidden to com-
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petitors who might supply a different component in the
overall system, but needs to be revealed to certification
authorities in order to obtain airworthiness. Large re-
search projects in the avionics domain (like CESAR [1]
or SAVI [4]) address certain collaborative aspects of the
design process (e.g. by assuming multiple subcontrac-
tors), but security aspects are restricted to that of the
system under design.
An increased level of collaboration in a model-driven
development process introduces additional confidential-
ity challenges to sufficiently protect the IPR of the col-
laborating parties, which are either overlooked or sig-
nificantly underestimated by existing initiatives. Even
within a single company, there are often teams with
differentiated responsibilities, areas of competence and
clearances. Such processes likewise demand confiden-
tiality and integrity of certain modeling artifacts.
1.2 Problems of coarse-grained access control
Existing practices for managing access control of mod-
els rely primarily upon the access control features of the
back-end repository. Coarse-grained access control poli-
cies aim to restrict access to the files that store models.
For instance, EMF models can be persisted as standard
XMI documents, which can be stored in repositories
providing file-based access and change management (as
in SVN [5], CVS [26]). Fine-grained access control poli-
cies, on the other hand, may restrict access to the model
on the row level (as in relational databases) or triple
level (as in RDF repositories). Unfortunately, coarse-
grained security policies are captured directly on the
storage (file) level often result in inflexible fragmenta-
tion of models in collaborative scenarios.
To illustrate the problem of coarse-grained permis-
sions, let us consider two collaborators, SW Provider1
and HW Supplier1 having full control over their model
(fragment). Now if HW Supplier1 intends to share part
of their model with SW Provider1, then either they need
to grant access to the entire model (which would mean
losing the confidentiality of certain intellectual proper-
ties), or split their model into two files, and give access
to only one fragment. For each additional actor SW
Provider2, the same argument applies; in the end, a
collaboratively developed system model would end up
being split into several fragments.
Even in the simple case depicted in Fig. 1, the model
needs to be split into two files (Model Fragment1 and
Model Fragment2) and access needs to be granted sep-
arately for each file when a SW Provider1 and a HW
Supplier1 collaborates. When a new collaborator, SW
Provider2 joins in the future who is allowed to par-
tially read all two existing fragments, each model frag-
Fig. 1: Problem with File-level Access Control
ment needs to be divided at least in two. In this exam-
ple, 5 fragments are required: one that can be read by
both SW Provider1 ⇔ SW Provider2, one accessible to
HW Supplier2 ⇔ SW Provider2, and three more private
model fragments for the three collaborators. If addi-
tional collaborators join the collaboration, the number
of fragments has to be increased further.
The example is updated in accordance with Fig. 1
As a result, coarse-grained access control can lead to
significant model fragmentation, which greatly increases
the complexity of storage and access control manage-
ment. In industrial practice, automotive models may
be split into more than 1000 fragments, which poses
a significant challenge for tool developers. Some model
persistence technologies (such as EMF’s default XMI
serialization) do not allow model fragments to cyclically
refer to each other, putting a stricter limit to fragmen-
tation. Hence, MDE use cases often demand the ability
to define access for each object (or even each property
of each object) independently.
Furthermore, coarse-grained access control lacks
flexibility, especially when accessing models from het-
erogeneous information sources in different collabora-
tion scenarios. For instance, they disallow type-specific
access control, i.e., to grant or restrict access to model
elements of a specific type (e.g., to all classes in a UML
model), which are stored in multiple files.
On the other hand, fine-grained access control ne-
cessitates to assign access rights to each model element.
As the size of the model grows, these permissions or
restrictions cannot be set and maintained manually for
each individual model element, but a systematic assign-
ment technique is needed.
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1.3 Goals
The main objective of the paper is to achieve secure col-
laborative modeling with fine-grained access control, by
using advanced model transformation techniques, while
relying upon existing storage back-ends to follow cur-
rent industrial best practices. In particular, we aim to
address the following high-level goals (refined later into
technical goals in Sec. 2):
G1 Fine-grained Access Control Management
to enforce read and write permissions of users sepa-
rately to each model object, attribute or reference.
G2 Secure and Versatile Offline Collaboration
where each collaborator can work with a model frag-
ment filtered in accordance with read permissions,
and processed using off-the-shelf MDE tools (e.g.
editor, verifier). A user may be disconnected from
any server or access control mechanism, and then
submit (commit) his updated version in the end.
G3 Secure and Efficient Online Collaboration
where multiple users can view and edit a model
hosted on a server repository in real-time while im-
posing different read and write permissions. Small
changes performed by one collaborator are quickly
and efficiently propagated to the views visible to
other users, without reinterpreting the entire model.
G4 General Collaboration Schema
that is adaptable for online and offline scenario
defining workflows of a server and multiple clients
to handle fine-grained access control management.
1.4 Contributions
In this paper, we define an approach for secure collab-
orative modeling using bidirectional model transforma-
tions to derive filtered secure views for each collaborator
and to propagate changes introduced into these views
back to a server. Our approach is uniformly applicable
to support both online and offline collaboration scenar-
ios, and it enforces fine-grained access control policies
for each collaborator during the derivation of views and
the back-propagation of changes.
We formalize the collaboration schema using com-
municating state machines and provide formal proofs
for certain correctness criteria using the FDR4 tool
[32]. The schema is integrated into existing version con-
trol systems using hook programs triggered by repos-
itory events to support offline collaborative scenarios
whereas a prototype tool of online collaboration is also
realized on the top of Eclipse RAP [51].
Finally, a detailed scalability evaluation is carried
out using models from the Wind Turbine Case Study
of the MONDO European FP7 project, which serves as
a motivating example for the paper.
This paper is an extension of [11, 20] by providing
(1) an in-depth precise specification of the bidirectional
transformation as well as the collaboration scheme, (2)
further technical details on its realization for both of-
fline and online collaborative scenarios, and (3) an ex-
tended scalability evaluation of our approach now also
covering the offline scenario.
1.5 Structure
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Our moti-
vating example is detailed and the challenges are in-
troduced in Sec. 2. Sec. 3 defines how models can be
decomposed into individual assests, and introduces the
rules that assign read and write permissions to assets.
In Sec. 4, we overview our bidirectional model trans-
formation for access control, while Sec. 5 describes our
secure collaboration schema and proves its correctness.
In Sec. 6, we give a brief overview on how to adapt this
collaborative modeling schema to online and offline sce-
narios. Sec. 7 describes the evaluation of our approach
and related work is overviewed in Sec. 8. Finally, Sec. 9
concludes our paper.
2 Case Study
2.1 Modeling Language
Our approach will be illustrated using a simplified ver-
sion of a modeling language for system integrators of
offshore wind turbine controllers, which served as one
of the case studies of the MONDO EU FP7 project [7].
The metamodel, defined in Ecore [52] and depicted in
Fig. 2, describes how the system builds up from modules
(Module) providing and consuming signals (Signal) that
send messages after a specific amount of time defined by
the frequency attribute. Modules are organized in a con-
tainment hierarchy of composite modules (Composite)
shipped by external vendors (vendor attribute), and
ultimately containing control unit modules (Control)
responsible for a given type of physical device (such
as pumps, heaters or fans: FanControl, HeaterControl,
PumpControl, respectively) with specific cycle priorities
(cycle attribute). A documentation is attached to each
signal (documentation attribute) to clarify its responsi-
bilities. Some of the signals are treated as confidential
intellectual property (ConfidentialSignal).
The design of wind turbine control units requires
specialized knowledge. There are three kinds of control
units, and each kind can only be modified by specialist
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Fig. 2: Simplified Metamodel of Wind Turbine Con-
trollers
Fig. 3: Sample Wind Turbine Instance Model
users with the appropriate qualification: fan, heater and
pump control engineers.
A sample instance model containing a hierarchy of
3 Composite modules with 4 Control units as sub-
modules, providing 6 Signals altogether where two of
them are Confidential Signals, is shown on Fig. 3.
Boxes represent objects (with attribute values as en-
tries within the box and their types shown as labels
on the tops). Arrows with diamonds represent contain-
ment edges, while arrows without diamonds represent
cross-references.
2.2 Security Requirements
Specialists are not allowed to modify (and in some cases,
read) parts of the model. For this purpose, the following
security requirements are stated for control unit special-
ists:
R1 Each group of specialists shall be responsible for a
specific kind of control unit (owned control units).
R2 Specialists shall see only those signals that are
within the scope for their owned control units, i.e.
signals provided by a module that is either (a) a
composite that directly contains an owned control
unit, or (b) any submodule (including the owned
control unit) contained transitively in such a com-
posite.
R3 Specialists shall be able to modify signals provided
by their owned control units.
R4 Specialists shall observe which modules consume
signals provided by their owned control units.
R5 Specialists shall see the vendor attributes in an ob-
fuscated form.
R6 Specialists must not see confidential signals.
2.3 Usage Scenarios
The system integrator company is hosting the wind tur-
bine control model on their collaboration server, where
it is stored, versioned, etc. There are two ways for users
to interact with it.
Online collaboration. A group of users may participate
in online collaboration, when they are continuously con-
nected to the central repository via an appropriate
client (e.g. web browser). Each user sees a live view of
those parts of the model, that he is allowed to access.
Changes need to be propagated on-the-fly between the
views of users in short transactions. These transactions
contain each modification such as create, update, delete
or move. Finally, the collaboration tool has to reject a
modification immediately when it violates a security re-
quirement.
The users can modify the model through their client,
which will directly forward the change to the collabora-
tion server. The server will decide whether the change
is permitted under write access restrictions. If it is al-
lowed, then the views of all connected users will be
updated transparently and immediately, though the
change may be filtered for them according to their read
privileges.
Offline collaboration. In case of offline collaboration,
when connecting to the server, each user can download a
model file containing those model elements that he is al-
lowed to see. The user can then view, process, and mod-
ify his downloaded model file locally. The model can be
developed with unmodified off-the-shelf tool, that need
not be aware of collaboration and access control. After
the modification, the changes will be uploaded to the
server in a long transaction.
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2.4 Challenges
Deriving from the goals stated in Sec. 1.3, we identify
the following challenges.
C1 Fine-grained Access Control of Model Artifacts.
To meet G1, the approach must enforce to allow or
deny model access separately for individual model
elements.
C2.1 Model Compatibility.
To meet G2 in off-line collaboration scenario, the
approach must be able to present the information
available to a given user as a self-contained model,
in a format that can be stored, processed, displayed
and edited by off-the-shelf modeling tools.
C2.2 Offline Models.
To meet G2 in an off-line collaboration scenario,
the approach must be able to present only the avail-
able information to a given user without maintain-
ing connectivity with any central server or authority
responsible for access control.
C3.1 Incrementality.
To meet G3 in an on-line collaboration scenario,
the approach must be able to process model mod-
ifications initiated by a user and apply the conse-
quences to the views available to other users without
re-processing the unchanged parts of the model.
C4.1 Correctness Criteria.
To meet G4, the approach must define the correct-
ness criteria of the collaboration schema and prove
their fulfillment.
C4.2 Adaptability.
To meet G4, the approach must realize the collab-
oration schema both in offline and online scenarios.
3 Access Control of Models
3.1 Modeling Preliminaries
In order to tackle challenges C1.1 and C2.1, we first
analyze how models can be decomposed into individual
assets for which access can be permitted and denied,
and under what conditions a filtered set of such assets
can be represented as a model that can be processed by
standard tools.
For the purposes of access control, a model is con-
ceived as a set of elementary model assets. An Asset
is an entity that the access control policy will protect.
Generally, models can be decomposed into object, ref-
erence and attribute assets.
Definition 1. Object assets are pairs formed of a
model element with its exact class for each model
element object;
ObjectAsset = ⟨object, type⟩
Definition 2. Reference assets are triples formed
of a source object, a reference and the referenced
target object, for each containment link and cross-
link between objects;
ReferenceAsset = ⟨objects, reference, objectt⟩
Definition 3. Attribute assets are triples formed of
a source object, an attribute and a data value, for
each (non-default) attribute value assignment;
AttributeAsset = ⟨object, attribute, value⟩
Definition 4. Models are triples formed of a set of
object, reference and attribute assets.
M = ⟨{ObjectAssset}, {ReferenceAsset}, {AttributeAsset}⟩
Note that there can be multi-valued attributes and
references in certain modeling platforms (e.g. EMF),
where an object is allowed to host multiple attribute
values (or reference endpoints) for that property. For
such properties, each entry at a source object will be
represented by separate attribute (or reference) assets.
Example 1. ObjectAsset(o1,Composite) is an
object asset, AttributeAsset(o10, cycle, low)
is an attribute asset and
ReferenceAsset(o2, consumes, o12) is a refer-
ence asset in our running example (depicted in
Fig. 3).
3.2 Consistency of Models
An arbitrary set of model assets does not necessarily
constitute a valid model; there may be consistency rules
imposed on the assets by the modeling platform to en-
sure the integrity of the model representation and the
ability to persist, read, and traverse models. Challenge
C2.1 requires that filtered models must be synthesized
as a set of model assets compatible with all consistency
rules of the underlying modeling platform.
Object Existence. Attributes and references imply that
the objects involved exist, having a type compatible
with the type of the attribute or reference.
Containment Hierarchy. In modeling languages that
have a notion of containment, certain references are
denoted as containment types realizing a contain-
ment hierarchy of objects. This hierarchy implies
a containment forest of all objects. Therefore, ob-
jects must either be root objects of the model, or be
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transitively contained by a root object via a chain
of objects that are all existing. (Modeling languages
that do not have containment are of course also sup-
ported, with all objects considered root objects.)
Opposite Features. There are opposite references de-
fined as a pair of references where the existence of
a relation depends on its pair. For reference types
having an opposite, reference assets of the two types
exist in symmetric pairs.
Multiplicity Constraints. The number of reference as-
sets for a given reference of an object needs to satisfy
the multiplicity constraints.
The following paragraph (along with a clarification
to containment hierarchies) are added to answer the
reviewers questions related to containment hierarchy
and OCL Constraints.
We distinguish these low-level internal consistency
rules from high-level, language-specific well-formedness
constraints. Well-formedness constraints (also known as
design rules or consistency rules) define additional re-
strictions to the metamodel that the instance models
need to satisfy. These type of constraints are often de-
scribed using OCL [2]. The difference between the two
concepts is that violating the latter kind does not pre-
vent a model from being processed and stored in a given
modeling technology. Thus only internal consistency is
required for access control.
3.3 Model Obfuscation
Obfuscation is defined as the process of ”making some-
thing less clear and harder to understand, especially in-
tentionally” [3]. The first purpose of obfuscation in pro-
gramming was to distribute C sources in an encrypted
way to prevent access to confidential intellectual prop-
erty in the code [35].
A model obfuscation takes a model as input and
yields another model as output where the structure
of the model remains the same but data values (such
as names, identifiers or other strings) are altered. Two
data values that were identical before the obfuscation
will also be identical after it, but the obfuscated value
computed based on a different input string will be com-
pletely different. Moreover, all the altered values can be
reverted by the original owner of the model using a pri-
vate key.
In the context of access control, obfuscation can be
applied to data values of attribute assets. An obfus-
cated data describes its presence in the model (e.g. the
value of an object’s attribute is not empty), but the real
content of that asset remains hidden.
Definition 5. The obf function takes a data Value
and a Seed as inputs and maps the value to
(Vˆalue). The Obf−1 function is the inverse of obf
which returns the original data if the same Seed is
used.
obf :: (Value,Seed)→ Vˆalue
obf−1 :: (Vˆalue,Seed)→ Value
Example 2. In our example, the security re-
quirement R5 prescribes to obfuscate the ven-
dor attribute A of object root that may become
”oA3DD43CF5” in the views.
3.4 Access Control Rules and Permissions
Our fine-grained access control policy has to assign per-
missions separately for each model asset. In case of a
large model, there can be thousands of assets where it
is tedious to manually assign permissions one-by-one.
Therefore the policies are constructed from a list of ac-
cess control rules, each of which controls the access to a
selected set of model assets by certain users or groups,
and may either allow or deny the read and/or write
operation.
Definition 6. An access control rule (ac-rule) de-
fines a partial function that applies judgments (al-
low, obfuscate, deny) to specify the privileges of
a certain user ∈Users for an operation type (read
or write) on a given subset of assets.
let Op = [read,write]
let Judgement = [allow, obfuscate, deny]
ac-rule :: Assets×Op×Users→ Judgment
Definition 7. An access control policy defines an
effective permission function (permissionEff) de-
rived from a list of access control rules that ap-
plies judgments (allow, obfuscate, deny) for both
operation types (read and write) of each assets in
the context of a certain user ∈Users
permissionEff :: Asset×Op×Users→ Judgement
To manage the challenge C2.1, it is necessary to
eliminate inconsistencies introduced by access control
rules. In addition, these access control rules can be con-
tradictory as one access control rule might grant a per-
mission for a given part of the model while another rule
may deny it at the same time.
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Added: ”... as one access control rule might grant a
permission for a given part of the model while an-
other rule may deny it at the same time” to describe
how two access control rules can be contradictory
Hence, the effective permission function
(permissionEff) needs to derive a consistent and
conflict-free set of judgments. Our previous work [12,20]
describes the effective permission calculation in more
detail, but here we give a brief overview on conflict
resolution, permission dependencies, and outline some
reconciliation strategies as well.
Conflicts. Conflicting policy rules can be resolved by
assigning priorities to each rule. Hence, the rules with
higher priority overrides the other rules.
Sanity. The sanity of the policy implies that a user
should not be allowed to write values and model as-
sets that are not readable to them. Therefore without
effective read permission, write permission is automat-
ically denied as well, even if there are no rules to deny
the write permissions.
Read dependencies. Read permissions may depend on
permissions on other model assets.
If a model element is unreadable, its incoming and
outgoing references and its attributes shall not be read-
able either, otherwise the set of readable assets would
not form a self-consistent model.
In modeling platforms (such as EMF) with a notion
of containment between objects, readable objects can-
not be contained in unreadable objects (as the latter do
not exist in the front model); this needs to introduce a
new container for the orphan object (e.g. promoting it
to a top-level object of the model). Alternatively, this
implies that an object hidden from the front model will
hide the entire containment subtree rooted there (this
latter choice is used in the case study).
Write dependencies. Write permissions likewise have
dependencies on other model assets.
In general, creating/modifying/removing references
between objects requires a writable source object and
a readable target object; but some modeling platforms
including EMF have bidirectional references (or oppo-
sites), for which internal consistency dictates that the
target object must be writable as well.
A metamodel may constrain a reference (or at-
tribute) to be single-valued; assigning a new target to
the reference would automatically remove the old one,
so a user can only be allowed the former write operation
if they are allowed the latter.
Similarly, removing an object from the model im-
plies removing all references pointing to it, and all ob-
jects contained within it.
Example 3. An access control policy is set up to
meet the security needs of the running example
introduced in Sec. 2.2. A possible permission func-
tion (permissionEff) is visualized in Fig. 4. For in-
stance, Pump Control Engineers have full access
to PumpControl objects and their provided Signals
(squares marked with bold borders and blue head-
ers); however they cannot access ConfidentialSignal
objects (squares with dashed borders). The rest of
the objects are readable, but not writable by this
group of users (squares with thick borders and or-
ange headers). If an object is only required to pre-
serve read dependencies, its identifier is obfuscated
(marked with ”O” letter in a square next to the
attribute) and all other attributes remain hidden
(”H” letter in the square). Finally, bold edges are
writable by the engineers, i.e. the writable signals
(s2, s5) can be removed from their container, or
new signals can be created under the writable con-
trols (ctrl2, ctrl4); thick edges represent read-
able references (in this example, these are required
mostly to preserve containment hierarchy); and
the rest of the dashed edges are hidden from the
engineers.
4 Bidirectional Model Transformation for
Access Control Management
4.1 The Access Control Lens
Due to read access control, some users are not allowed
to learn certain model assets. This means that the com-
plete model (which we will refer to as the gold model)
differs from the view of the complete model that is ex-
posed to a particular user (the front model).
In theory, access control could be implemented with-
out manifesting the front model, by hiding the entire
gold model behind a model access layer that is aware
of the security policy and enforces access control rules
upon each read and write operation performed by the
user. However, challenge C2.1 requires users to access
their front models using standard modeling tools; more-
over, while challenge C2.2 requires that in the offline
collaboration scenario, they can“take home” their front
model files without being directly connected to the gold
model. In order to meet these goals, we propose to man-
ifest the front models of users as regular stand-alone
models, derived from a corresponding gold model by
applying a bidirectional model transformation.
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(a) Fan Control Engineer
(b) Heater Control Engineer
(c) Pump Control Engineer
Fig. 4: Effective Permissions of the Example
Fig. 5: Secure Access Control by Bidirectional Lenses
In the literature of bidirectional transforma-
tions [23], a lens (or view-update) is defined as an
asymmetric bidirectional transformation relation where
a source knowledge base (KB) completely determines a
derived (view) KB, while the latter may not contain all
information contained in the former, but it can still be
updated directly. The two operations of crucial impor-
tance in realizing a lens relationship are the following:
– Get obtains the derived KB from the source KB
that completely determines it, and
– PutBack updates the source KB, based on the
derived view and the previous version of the source
(the latter is required as the derived view may not
contain all information).
The bidirectional transformation relations between
a gold model (containing all assets) and a front model
(containing a filtered view) satisfies the definition of a
lens. The Get process applies the access control pol-
icy for filtering the gold model into the front model.
The PutBack process takes a front model updated by
the user, and transfers the changes back into the gold
model.
Definition 8. The Get process derives the front
model from the gold model in accordance with the
read permissions.
Get :: (MG, permissionEff)→ MF
Definition 9. The PutBack process enforces the
write permissions and derives the updated gold
model from the modified front model and the orig-
inal version of the gold model.
PutBack :: (M′F ,MG, permissionEff)→ M′G
The lens concept is illustrated by Fig. 5. Initially,
the Get operation is carried out to obtain the front
model for a given user from the gold model. Due to
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the read access control rules, some objects in the model
may be hidden (along with their connections to other
objects); additionally, some connections between oth-
erwise readable objects may be hidden as well; finally,
some attribute values of readable objects may be omit-
ted, obfuscated, or hidden altogether. If the user subse-
quently updates the front model, the PutBack oper-
ation checks whether these modifications were allowed
by the write access control rules. If yes, the changes
are propagated back to the gold model, keeping those
model elements that were hidden from the user intact
(preserved from the previous version of the gold model).
Write access control checks are performed by the
PutBack operation as they (a) may prevent a user
from writing to the model, and (b) access control rules
needs to be evaluated on the gold model.
Access control rules cannot be evaluated directly on
the front model since only the gold model contains all
information. Thus write access control can only be en-
forced by taking into account the gold model as well.
Therefore, write access control must be combined with
the lens transformation. In particular, PutBack must
check write permissions; and fail (by rolling back any
effects of the commit or operation) if a certain modifi-
cation cannot be applied to the gold model.
Example 4. In our running example, the original
model (Fig. 3) acts as the gold model containing
all the information. The Get transformation ap-
plies the permissions and produces a front model
for each specialist. In Fig. 4, each front model con-
sists of
– the objects with bold or solid borders;
– the references with solid lines;
but the objects and references with dashed borders
and lines are removed. Whereas, the attributes
marked with
– an ”O” in a square are obfuscated;
– an ”H” in a square are removed.
When a PumpControlEngineer tries to modify the
frequency of the signal s3 from 6 to 10, the Put-
Back operation is responsible for declining this
change as the access control rules deny the modifi-
cation (the signal s3 is readable but not writable).
On the other hand, if a PumpControlEngineer
tries to modify the frequency of the signal s2 from
29 to 17 the PutBack operation propagates the
change back to the gold model (the signal s2 is
writable) by identifying the signal s2 in the gold
model and setting its frequency attribute.
s3 is replaced with s2 in accordance with the
example
4.2 Transformation Design
Both Get and PutBack are designed as rule-based
model transformations [18]. In the terminology of model
transformation, gold and front models act as the source
and target models, respectively.
To address challenge C3.1, the transformations
need to be reactive and incremental computations in
the online collaboration scenario.
Reactive transformations [10] follow an event-driven
behavior where the events are triggered by model ma-
nipulations such as creation/modification/deletion of
model assets. The transformation observes these events
and reacts to them.
Incrementality [18] means that there is no need
to re-execute the whole transformation upon a small
change introduced into the model. Source incremental-
ity is the property of a transformation that only re-
evaluates the modified parts of the source model. Tar-
get incrementality, means that only the necessary parts
of the target model are modified by the transformation,
there is no need to recreate the new target model from
scratch.
Definition 10. A transformation rule rule is associ-
ated with a precondition ∈ Preconditions, an ac-
tion ∈ Actions (parametrized by a match of the
precondition),and a numerical priority ∈ P value.
rule = (precondition, action,P)
Definition 11. A transformation T consists of a set
of transformation rules ({rule1, rule2 . . . rulen}) that
a transformation engine T E executes to incremen-
tally derive an updated target model M ′T from a
source and target model MS ,MT .
T = {rule1, rule2 . . . rulen}
T E :: (MS , T ,MT )→M ′T
Transformation execution repeatedly fires the rules
as follows:
1. finds all the matches of rule preconditions of all rules
(this set of matches is efficiently and incrementally
maintained during the transformation),
2. selects a match from the rule with the highest pri-
ority,
3. executes the action of the rule along that match;
The loop terminates when there are no more precondi-
tion matches.
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According to the process Get and PutBack of the
lens, we define TGet and TPutBack transformations, re-
spectively.
These transformations consist of four groups of
transformation rules based on its direction (Get, Put-
Back) and whether it adds or removes assets from the
model (additive, subtractive):
In case of Get process:
Additive adds assets to MF if no corresponding as-
sets are present in MG
Subtractive removes assets from MF if no corre-
sponding assets are present in MG
In case of PutBack process:
Additive adds assets to MG if no corresponding as-
sets are present in MF
Subtractive removes assets from MG if no corre-
sponding assets are present in MF
All four groups consist of one rule for each kind of model
asset; in the context of this paper, we distinguish 3
kinds of model assets (see Sec. 3.1); this makes twelve
transformation rules altogether, described in the tables
of Appendices A and B.
The preconditions require to initialize correspon-
dence between front and gold models. For that purpose,
we introduce a trace function.
Definition 12. The trace function is responsible for
associating two object assets with each other:
trace :: (ObjectAsset(oG, t))→ ObjectAsset(oF , t′)
We select three example transformation rules listed
in Table 1 to describe the key concept of how the access
control is managed.
Additive Get Object rule
(ruleAdditive Get Object)
The additive rule of TGet related to object assets is
responsible for propagating object addition from the
gold model MG to the front model MF . A change is
recognized in the precondition which selects pairs of
ObjectAsset(oG, t) and ObjectAsset(oF , t) as follows: an
ObjectAsset(oG, t) in the gold model that has no cor-
responding ObjectAsset(oF , t) in the front model, but
it should be readable according to the permissionEff.
The action part will create a new ObjectAsset(oF , t)
and establish a correspondence relation between these
two objects.
”... which selects pairs of ObjectAsset(oG, t) and
ObjectAsset(oF , t)” is added to explain the number 2
in the superscript
Example 5. A system administrator who has access
to the original gold model (depicted in Fig. 3) adds
a new signal object sNG under the heater control
unit ctrl3. This change needs to be propagated
to the front models as the new signal should be
at least readable (also writable for Heater Control
Engineers).
TGet transformation will be executed between
MG and the front model of Pump Control En-
gineer MpumpF (depicted in Fig. 4c). The pre-
condition of the ruleAdditive Get Object selects the
ObjectAsset(sNG,Signal) as it has no correspond-
ing ObjectAsset(sNF ,Signal) in the front model.
The action part creates ObjectAsset(sNF ,Signal)
and traces it back to ObjectAsset(sNG,Signal).
Exactly the same sequence happens in case of the
front model of Fan Control Engineer M fanF (de-
picted in Fig. 4a)a.
a ruleAdditive Get Reference takes care of the contain-
ment reference between sNG and ctrl3.
Additive Get Attribute rule
(ruleAdditive Get Attribute)
The additive rule of TGet related to attribute as-
sets is responsible for propagating data value inser-
tion on the gold model MG to the front model MF .
The precondition of the ruleAdditive Get Attribute selects
AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v) in the gold model that has no
corresponding AttributeAsset(oF , attr, v
′) in the front
model, but it should be readable according to the
permissionEff. The value of v
′ is calculated in accor-
dance with its read permission (potentially in an obfus-
cated form).
Example 6. The system administrator modifies the
frequency attribute of s1G from 30 to 15. This
change needs to be propagated to the front mod-
els.
1) TGet will be executed between MG and the
front model of Pump Control Engineer MpumpF
(depicted in Fig. 4c). The precondition of the
ruleAdditive Get Attribute selects the s1F object
from the front model attribute frequency and
value 15 as AttributeAsset(s1F , frequency, 15)
does not exist, but it should be read-
able in Fpump. The action part adds the
AttributeAsset(s1F , frequency, 15) to M
pump
F .
a
2) TGet will be executed between MG and the
front model of Fan Control Engineer MfanF (de-
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rule Additive Get Object Priority 4
Precondition :: (MG(OAG,RAG,AAG),MF (OAF ,RAF ,AAF ), permissionEff)→ {ObjectAsset}2
{ObjectAsset(oG, t),ObjectAsset(oF , t′)|ObjectAsset(oG, t) ∈ OAG, permissionEff(ObjectAsset(oG, t), read) ̸= deny,
̸ ∃ObjectAsset(oF , t′) ∈ OAF : trace(ObjectAsset(oG, t)) = ObjectAsset(oF , t′), t = t′}
Action
OAF := OAF ∪ {ObjectAsset(oF , t′)}, trace(ObjectAsset(oG, t)) := ObjectAsset(oF , t′)
rule Additive Get Attribute Priority 5
Precondition :: (MG(OAG,RAG,AAG),MF (OAF ,RAF ,AAF ), permissionEff)→ {AttributeAsset}
{AttributeAsset(oF , attr, v′)|AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v) ∈ AAG, permissionEff(AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v), read) ̸= deny,
∃ObjectAsset(oF , t) : ObjectAsset(oF , t) ∈ AAF , trace(ObjectAsset(oG, t)) = ObjectAsset(oF , t), ̸ ∃AttributeAsset(oF , attr, v′) :
v′ =
{
v, permissionEff(AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v), read) = allow
obf(v), permissionEff(AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v), read) = obfuscate
,AttributeAsset(oF , attr, v
′) ∈ AAF }
Action
AAF := AAF ∪ {AttributeAsset(oF , attr, v′)}
rule Subtractive PutBack Object Priority 3
Precondition :: (MG(OAG,RAG,AAG),MF (OAF ,RAF ,AAF ), permissionEff)→ {ObjectAsset}
{ObjectAsset(oG, t)|ObjectAsset(oG, t) ∈ OAG, permissionEff(ObjectAsset(oG, t), read) ̸= deny,
̸ ∃ObjectAsset(oF , t′) : trace(ObjectAsset(oG, t)) = ObjectAsset(oF , t′), t = t′}
Action
If permissionEff(ObjectAsset(oG, type), write) ̸= deny then
OAG := OAG \ObjectAsset(oG, t), trace \ObjectAsset(oG, t)|trace(ObjectAsset(oG, t)) = ObjectAsset(oF , t) else ↘↙
Table 1: Additive Get and Subtractive PutBack rules
picted in Fig. 4a). But now, the precondition has
no match as s1 is not readable inMfanF
a Similarly, ruleSubtractive Get Attribute will han-
dle the removal of the previous attribute asset
AttributeAsset(s1F , frequency, 30) before the addi-
tion.
Subtractive PutBack Object
(ruleSubtractive PutBack object)
The subtractive rule of TPutBack related to object as-
sets is responsible for propagating object asset removals
from the front model MF to the gold model MG. A
deletion is recognized in the precondition as follows:
there is an ObjectAsset(oG, t) in the gold model that
has no corresponding ObjectAsset(oF , t) in the front
model. The action part checks the write permissions
of ObjectAsset(oG, t). If the removal of the asset is de-
nied, TPutBack terminates after a rollback. Otherwise,
it removes the selected object asset.
Example 7. A Pump Control Engineer removes
ctrl1F object from his front model M
pump
F (de-
picted in Fig. 4c). This change needs to be
propagated be to the gold model, thus Put-
Back transformation will be executed between
MpumpF and the gold model MG (depicted in
Fig. 4c). The precondition of the rule selects
ObjectAsset(ctrl1G, FanControl). In the action
part, the rule realizes that the permissions do not
allow to delete ctrl1 object, thus the transforma-
tion terminates and rejects the change.
To sum up, Get is responsible for enforcing read
permissions in front models, while PutBack takes care
of write permissions. If any write permission is violated,
the transformation terminates and the front model (tar-
get) is reverted to its original state.
4.3 Discussion and Analysis
At the request of reviewers, we have added this sec-
tion with almost entirely new content to discuss
properties of the bidirectional transformation, along
with Appendix C to contain the proofs of these
properties.
In the following paragraphs, we analyze and discuss
properties of the lens transformations.
First, in Sec. 4.3.1, we state the properties that
the lens transformations are expected to exhibit. In
Sec. 4.3.2, we state and discuss an important assump-
tion that will be vital to proving the aforementioned
properties in Appendix C. Finally, in Sec. 4.3.3 we will
turn our attention to deviations of the technical real-
ization from the ideal formulation.
4.3.1 Desirable Properties of the Transformation
In the following, we present a number of properties that
the lens transformations would be desirable to exhibit.
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We first state these desirable properties, and then dis-
cuss them individually in subsequent sections to find
which ones are met under which conditions by the pre-
sented transformations.
Transformation Property 1 (Termination)
Given a pair of starting models, Get and PutBack
shall both terminate after a finite number of rule
executions.
Transformation Property 2 (Confluence) Given
a pair of starting models and running the transfor-
mation to completion, the terminal state of both Get
and PutBack shall be independent from the chosen
execution order of rule application, i.e. both Get and
PutBack define a deterministic function.
Transformation Property 3 (Confidentiality)
Get shall yield a front model that contains exactly
those assets that are visible according to effective read
permissions.
Transformation Property 4 (Integrity)
PutBack shall successfully accept a modified front
model if and only if its differences from the original
front model do not violate effective write permissions.
Transformation Property 5 (GetPut) PutBack
shall be a no-op when applied on the front model
directly returned by Get, i.e. if the user makes no
changes, the gold model shall not be updated.
Transformation Property 6 (PutGet) Get shall
be a no-op when applied on the gold model previously
updated by a successful PutBack (from the same
front), i.e. if the gold model has not changed, the front
model shall not be updated.
Transformation Property 7 (PutPut) A user ap-
plying a sequence of successful PutBack operations
(and changing the front model inbetween) should have
the same ultimate effect on the gold model as applying
only the last one.
The first few properties (Prop. 1, Prop. 2 ) are gen-
erally expected of most rule-based model transforma-
tions, in order to define an actual deterministic trans-
formation function. Then Prop. 3 and Prop. 4 state the
security-specific requirements.
Next, Prop. 5 and Prop. 6 pertain specifically to
bidirectional transformations, and are widely promoted
(see e.g. [23,47], also [27] specifically for security views)
as very important “well-behavedness” properties that
users of bidirectional transformations would most cer-
tainly expect. They enable the lens transformations to
truly realize an updateable view.
Finally, Prop. 7 provides even stronger predictabil-
ity guarantees, but is often considered very restrictive
and therefore optional in the literature. A benefit of
this law is that user modifications are undoable, i.e. the
original state of the system (incl. gold model) can be re-
stored when a change to the from model is reverted. On
the other hand, it might unfortunately disallow certain
sensible extensions, an example for which we include
below.
As introduced in [12], a possible sample refine-
ment of the write permission levels could be {deny <
dangle < allow}. Cross-references with write permis-
sion level dangle can not be normally modified by the
user, but they can be removed as the side effect of delet-
ing the source or target object of the reference (if that
deletion is permitted). Unlike the usual allowed write
permission, dangle does not imply the readability of
the asset, so this kind of deletion is possible even if the
cross-link is not visible to the user. Imagine a traceabil-
ity link that points from a hidden part of the model to a
visible object; the difference between assigning deny or
dangle is that the target object can not be deleted by
the user in the former case, while its deletion would be
allowed (with an invisible side-effect of removing the
traceability link) in the latter case. These dangle se-
mantics can be similarly extended to attributes or con-
tained objects that might be attached as (invisible or
read-only) tags to objects; they must not be modified
by the user, but will be removed along with the object
they are attached to if the object is deleted. It is easy
to see that (a) such a feature would be quite useful in
many practical applications of the approach presented
in the paper, yet (b) Prop. 7 will not hold, as undoa-
bility is lost when dangling links/attributes/objects are
removed.
4.3.2 Regularity of Policy
Constant complement [8], a common strategy for prov-
ing desirable properties of secure views, involves parti-
tioning the data into a readable part and the so-called
complement. This partitioning can be used e.g. to ver-
ify whether PutBack (translator in the terminology
of [8]) may possibly change the complement (which
would violate Prop. 7). Similarly, correctness proofs can
benefit from applying a second kind of partitioning [27]
into a writable and endorsed part of the model.
Unfortunately, these partitioning schemes do not
apply perfectly to our approach for the simple reason
that a single asset might move from one partition to
another as the model evolves - in fact even during the
execution of PutBack. This is due to the fact that our
approach is more powerful: we do not consider explicit
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access control attributes of assets, but rather derive ef-
fective permissions from policy rules based on arbitrary
model queries (over the gold model) that can take into
account the wider context of assets; thus it is possible to
change the effective permissions for a given asset (even
without directly changing the asset itself). Therefore we
first make the following assumption, and then discuss
violating cases separately:
Assumption 1 (Regularity) For any transforma-
tion run, there exists a constant permission set for all
assets (i.e. a constant partitioning of assets based on
permission levels) so that effective permissions will al-
ways evaluate to results consistent with this fixed per-
mission set when they are evaluated during the run (i)
as a condition excluding activations of higher-priority
rules, or (ii) as a precondition to an individual rule
to be executed, when higher-priority rules have already
been found to have no matches, (iii) as a condition for
rejecting disallowed write attempts, or (iv) to determine
termination.
Note that Asm. 1 does not require that the actual
effective permissions (as evaluated following the policy
by the appropriate algorithms [12, 20]) remain entirely
constant, that would not be feasible. For example, if
a user creates a new model element, the correspond-
ing asset propagated to the gold model by PutBack
would only evaluate as writeable once it exists in the
first place. What is actually required is that permissions
are not allowed to flip-flop; i.e. a transformation should
never observe a particular asset change its effective per-
missions if the transformation has already acted upon
the old value of the effective permissions. This condi-
tion is met in the previous example, as we can include
the newly created asset in the constant permission set
as writeable: the asset did not exists in the gold model
before its creation, so no rules would have ever observed
it as an existing but non-writeable asset; as far as the
rules are concerned, the asset could have always been
listed as writeable in the permission set.
Get leaves the gold model and thus the effective
permissions unchanged, so Asm. 1 holds trivially. For
PutBack, however, it is possible to come up with sce-
narios where Asm. 1 is violated. One of these cases is
privilege escalation, where a user can make a change
somewhere in the model that would grant them addi-
tional read or write privileges somewhere else that they
did not previously have (even though those assets ex-
isted before). The other case is lockout, where a user can
make a change that will have the side-effect of losing
their read or write access on some assets (even though
those assets continue to exist). We believe both of these
cases are likely symptoms of defective policy definition,
and a system can only be considered secure and reliable
if it does not exhibit these behaviours (or only in a very
controlled manner).
Therefore, in the proofs for the properties of
Sec. 4.3.1, we consider Asm. 1 to hold, and apply
partitioning-based arguments partly similar to those
in [8,27]. This limitation to the case with regularity is,
on one hand, necessary to prove the properties stated
earlier (the exception is Prop. 1; the transformations
will be shown to terminate regardless whether regular-
ity holds). On the other hand, the limitation is pru-
dent for the above listed reasons of security. Finally, the
limitation is also feasible, as it is fairly easy to screen
changes during PutBack and reject them if they lead
to either privilege escalation or lockout. Static analy-
sis of policy definitions regarding their susceptibility to
these problems is left as future work.
Now we are ready to sketch conditional proofs for
each of the listed properties to hold for the transfor-
mations induced by rule sets in Appendix A and Ap-
pendix B; the proof sketches are found in Appendix C.
4.3.3 Realization in EMF
We realized the presented lens transformation in the
Eclipse Modeling Platform (EMF) [52]. Instead of ap-
proaches specifically designed for easy specification of
bidirectional transformations, the unidirectional and re-
active VIATRA framework [54] has been chosen for its
(a) target-incremental transformations and (b) source-
incremental model queries to define rule preconditions.
The presented transformation rules, as well as
the proof sketches, are formulated on technology-
independent models defined as a set of model assets. Ac-
tual model representations - EMF in our case - expose
an object-oriented API instead. Therefore, we have im-
plemented a relational model wrapper layer that exposes
the contents of the model through a writeable API as a
set of model assets (essentially tuples). This abstrac-
tion, however, is incomplete: the underlying object-
oriented model structure (i) may not be compatible
with all set operations, and (ii) may allow a given set
of operations only in certain sequences. The transfor-
mation must enforce these constraints.
The first problem occurs if adding or removing a
model asset would violate the internal consistency (see
Sec. 3.1) of the model; this is avoided by the consistency
property of effective permission function in such a way
that bothGet and PutBack would only attempt valid
changes to the front and gold models, respectively.
The second problem occurs if valid changes are at-
tempted in the wrong order, e.g. if a reference asset is
only deleted after deleting the object asset for one of
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the endpoints. By choosing the transformation rule pri-
orities accordingly, the object, attribute and reference
rules are ordered in a way that avoids violating these
kinds of constraints in all but one cases. The remaining
case is object containment, e.g. a child object cannot be
added to the model before its container object is cre-
ated. This depends on the ordering of two instances of
the object rule, and thus cannot simply be expressed
using rule-level fixed priorities. To solve this problem,
the relational model wrapper temporarily allows “un-
rooted” model objects detached from the model. Note
that the EMF API itself allows the existence of such
detached model objects, they are just not treated as
part of the model (resource set) by default, which our
model wrapper needs to circumvent.
As a further effect of this abstraction layer, there is a
genuine loss of information: the ordering of multi-valued
collections is not preserved in the relational representa-
tion. See Sec. 6.3.2 for discussion.
As a slight technical hurdle, the EMF-based query
engine of VIATRA, in charge of interpreting the query-
based security policy, is not actually capable of evalu-
ating permission queries on assets that are non-existent
in the gold model. A workaround is applied in practice
to the additive PutBack attribute rule (the only rule
where this is relevant, due to obfuscation), which we
omit here.
Finally, we note that in order to simplify the lan-
guage of the discussion, we have informally described
assets as potentially being contained in both the gold
and front models. Since a single EMF object is con-
tained in at most one model, it would be more pre-
cise to say that the two models contain disjoint assets,
that are related by the equivalence induced by the trace
function (see Sec. 4.2).
5 Collaboration Scheme
To satisfy our goal G4, a general collaboration scheme
is required including the bidirectional lens transforma-
tion between a server and several clients to enforce ac-
cess control policies correctly.
The server stores the gold models and clients can
download their specific front models. Modifications, ex-
ecuted by a client, can be submitted to the server and
downloaded by the other clients. These are the basic
actions that nowadays, a version control system (VCS)
should provide to a user. In case of various implementa-
tions, these actions may be called differently (e.g. check-
out, update, commit in SVN or clone, pull, push in Git).
According to the basic actions supported by any
VCS, we define the basic operations of the collabora-
tion scheme as follows:
Checkout downloads the model from the server-side
to the workspace of a specific client who initiated
the operation.
Update retrieves the model changes from the server-
side to the workspace of a specific client who initi-
ated the operation.
Commit propagates the changes of a specific client to
the server-side.
5.1 Formalization of the Collaboration
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 describes the behavior of collaboration
scheme as state machines for the server and the client.
A state machine consists of states (represented by
boxes) and transitions (denoted by directed edges) be-
tween states. Each state-machine has an initial state
(denoted by arrow from a black circle) and a current
state that specifies the system at a certain time.
The system can accept input events and send out-
put events during its process (denoted by labels on the
edges where ”?” and ”!” mean receiving and sending a
certain event, respectively, following process-algebraic
notation). In the concept of collaboration, each event
is assigned to a collaborator using ”.” symbol after the
name of event e.g. input.x/output.y means, that the col-
laborator x initiates an input and the transition pro-
duces an output to the collaborator y. A transition will
be executed immediately when its input event arrives
and during the execution it produces its output event.
Compound state (visualized as boxes containing
other states) refines the behavior of a given state by
defining its own state-machine where only one state can
be active.
Orthogonal regions (divided by dashed borders) sep-
arate the behavior of independent states and they are
processed concurrently. In each region, only one state
can be active at a time.
Two state-machines can synchronize on events send-
ing by one and received by the other one.
Server (Fig. 6). Its state machine has three orthogo-
nal regions to handle the commit,update and checkout
requests concurrently.
Checkout and Update. In case of receiving check-
out and update requests, our approach rejects them
when a user has no access to the model itself1 by
sending an accessDenied event followed by a failure
event. Otherwise, a success event is sent.
1 Note that we make a distinction between a user having
no access to a model at all, and a user having access to the
model, but nothing is readable in it.
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Upon an update request, it is also checked, whether
the client’s model is up-to-date and then an upTo-
Date event is produced followed by a success event.
Commit. The process of receiving commit requests
consists of Idle, Locked, Synchronization and Unlock
hierarchical states:
Idle state accepts commit requests from any collab-
orator. It produces an accessDenied event when
the user has no access to the model; or a need-
ToUpdate event when the user needs to update
his/her model locally to be able to commit the
modifications. Both events are followed by a fail-
ure event. Otherwise, the system locks the model
to prevent concurrent processing any other com-
mit requests and activates the Locked state.
Locked state executes the TPutBack in the name of
the commit owner (x) and rejects the commit re-
quests from any collaborator (y) by sending an
otherCommitUnderExecution event with a fail-
ure event. After the execution of the transforma-
tion, a policyViolated event is sent to x, if the
changes violated the access control policy and
the system steps to Unlock state. Otherwise, a
putback event leads the system to the Synchro-
nization state.
Synchronization state is responsible for sending the
success event to the owner of the commit and
executing TGet to propagate the changes to other
collaborators (denoted by output event get for
all collaborator except the owner of the commit
in the state Sync). Then systems moves forward
to the Unlock state.
Unlock state is responsible for unlocking the model
in all cases (unlock event). If the system is led to
this state after a policy violation, the state pro-
duces a failure event before the unlock. It also
rejects any other commit request by sending an
otherCommitUnderExecution event with a fail-
ure event.
Client (Fig. 7). Its state machine cooperates with the
server using the sending and receiving events that (i)
trigger an operation (commit,update,checkout); (ii) in-
dicate failures (needToUpdate); and (iii) indicate server
responses (success, failure). It consists of Checkout, Idle
and Update hierarchical states:
Checkout State. First, the clients need to check-
out their models represented by sending a checkout
event in the Checkout state. Based on the received
server response, the clients can move to Idle state.
Idle State. In Idle state, clients can commit or update
their changes by sending commit or update events.
All the events produced by the server can be re-
ceived, but only the needToUpdate event restricts
the behavior of the client by moving to Update state.
Update State. The clients need to initiate an up-
date request by sending a update event to be able
to commit their changes again.
5.2 Correctness Criteria
To address the challenge C4.1 we describe the correct-
ness criteria that the collaboration scheme needs to
satisfy:
Criterion 1. The scheme needs to be deadlock free
(i.e. all the locks need to be unlocked during a com-
mit operation).
Criterion 2. The scheme needs to be livelock free
(i.e. all the operations need to finish at some point
and lead the scheme to an idle state).
Criterion 3. Commit operation shall be rejected
while another commit is under execution.
Criterion 4. Commit operation shall propagate the
changes to all collaborators.
Criterion 5. Clients need to initiate an update op-
eration when it is required by the server.
Note that Criterion 1. and Criterion 2. are re-
quired to ensure that the collaboration can run without
any manual intervention. Criterion 3. declines over-
writing changes without notification of a commit hap-
pened previously. Criterion 5. enforces the clients to
avoid conflicting commits.
5.3 Proof of Correctness
In accordance with challenge 4.1, we formalized our
collaboration scheme as communicating sequential pro-
cesses (CSP) [45, 46] described in the appendix D to
prove its correctness. CSP is a formal specification lan-
guage of concurrent programs or systems where the
communications and interactions are presented in an
algebraic style.
The Server and Clients processes define the be-
havior of exactly 1 server and n clients, respectively.
The collaboration is specified as a concurrent execu-
tion (denoted by ||) of the server and clients where
the processes synchronize on a given set of events
SyncEvents: {commit, update, checkout, accessDenied,
policyViolated, needToUpdate, failure, success}.
Collaboration = Server||SyncEventsClients[1..n]
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Fig. 6: State-machine of the Collaboration Server
For the analysis, we used the FDR4 tool [32] to eval-
uate assertions over certain properties of the processes.
Criteria 1. and 2. requires the entire collaboration
process (Collaboration) to be deadlock and livelock
free. To check these properties, the : [deadlock free]
and : [divergence free] built-in structures are used, re-
spectively.
assert Collaboration : [deadlock free] (1)
assert Collaboration : [divergence free] (2)
The rest of the criteria requires to evaluate whether
the process formally refines a certain event sequence
according to the CSP models, namely the traces and
failures models. For that purpose, we use the T : and
F : structures, respectively, where
P T : < a, b, c > means that process P must be able
to perform the ordered sequence of the events a, b,
c and only these events.
P F : < a, b, c > means that process P must not be
able to refuse to perform the ordered sequence of
events a, b, c without performing any other event.
To check the remaining criteria, we introduce the ¬
symbol to negate assertions; the \ symbol that hides
events from the process and E denotes the events pro-
vided by all processes. The combination of these sym-
bols allows us to evaluate the processes in the context
of certain event, e.g. P \(E ∩ {a, b, c}) means that all
events are hidden from the process P except a, b and c.
Criterion 3. includes that after executing a
TPutBack, another T ′PutBack cannot be executed with-
out unlocking the model.
assert Server \(E ∩ {unlock, putback}) (3)
¬T : < putback.x, putback.y >
x, y ∈ Int, x ̸= y
Criterion 4. requires to execute TGet for all col-
laborators other than the owner of the commit after
a successfully executed TPutBack but before unlocking
the model. As we start the synchronization with col-
laborator 1, and then 2, it implies that the collabora-
tion scheme needs to execute it to the last collaborator,
namely n.
assert Server \(E ∩ {get.n, putback, unlock}) (4)
T : < putback.x, get.n, unlock.x >
x,N ∈ Int, x ̸= n
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Table 2: Results of the assertion in FDR4 tool
States Transitions time (s)
A
ss
er
ti
o
n
s
1 89233 227591 0.44
2 89233 227591 0.51
3 452 1121 0.13
4 417 1071 0.42
5 10 11 0.12
6 10 11 0.12
To satisfy Criterion 5., after a commit operation
rejected by the server with a need to update message,
the client (i) cannot commit again and (ii) must be able
to initiate update operation:
assert Clients \(E ∩ {commit, update, needToUpdate}) (5)
¬T : < commit.x, needToUpdate.x, commit.x >
assert Clients \(E ∩ {commit, update, needToUpdate}) (6)
F : < commit.x, needToUpdate.x, update.x >
x ∈ Int
As in the assertions we hide several events, the
FDR4 tool was able reduce the state space and the tran-
sitions that needs to be traversed.
We evaluated the assertions2 for n = 5 users. The
results are presented in Table 2. To check deadlock
and livelock properties, all the events and states are
required. Hence the tool traversed almost 90000 states
and 230000 transitions to prove these properties. To
verify the rest of the assertions, at most 500 states and
1100 transitions were enough to traverse. All the asser-
tions are evaluated within less than 0.51 seconds and
none of them failed.
According to the results, we state that our collab-
oration scheme for access control management satisfies
the correctness criteria.
6 Realization of Collaboration Scheme3
In accordance with challenge 4.2, our goal is to pro-
vide tool support for enforcing fine-grained model ac-
cess control rules in offline and online scenario realizing
the introduced collaboration scheme (see Sec. 5).
6.1 Offline Collaboration
In the offline scenario, models are serialized (e.g. in an
XMI format) and stored in a Version Control System
2 The complete formal specification is available at: goo.gl/
pJzIX1
3 Source codes and more details are at https://tinyurl.
com/sosym-access-control-source
(VCS). Users work on local working copies of the mod-
els in long transactions called commits. The goal of our
approach is to manage fine-grained access control on
the top of existing security layers available in the VCS.
6.1.1 Realization
The concept of gold and front models is extended to the
repository level where the two types of repositories are
called gold and front repositories as depicted in Fig. 8.
”The concept of gold and front models is extended
to the repository level ...” is added to introduce the
difference between the model and repository level
concepts
The gold repository contains complete information
about the gold models, but it is not accessible to collab-
orators. Each user has a front repository, containing a
full version history of front models. New model versions
are first added to the front repository; then changes in-
troduced in these revisions will be interleaved into the
gold models using PutBack transformation. Finally,
the new gold revision will be propagated to the front
repositories of other users using Get transformation.
As a result, each collaborator continues to work with a
dedicated VCS as before, thus they are unaware that
this front repository may contain filtered and obfus-
cated information only.
Existing access control mechanisms (such as fire-
walls) are used to ensure that the gold model is ac-
cessible to superusers only, and each regular user can
only access their own front repository. These regular
users can use any compatible VCS client to communi-
cate with their front repository, being unaware of col-
laboration mechanisms in the background.
This scheme enforces the access control rules even if
users access their personal front repositories using stan-
dard VCS clients and off-the-shelf modeling tools. Nev-
ertheless, optional client-side collaboration tools may
still be used to improve user experience, e.g. for smart
model merging [21], user-friendly lock management [15],
or preemptive warning about potential write access vi-
olations that greatly enhances the usability and appli-
cability of the offline scenario.
6.1.2 Realization of the Collaboration Scheme
In the current prototype, our collaboration scheme is re-
alized by extending an off-the-shelf VCS server, namely
Subversion [5]. Subversion provides features of the col-
laboration scheme by default:
File-level access control
is responsible for sending accessDenied event to the
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Fig. 7: State-machine of the Collaboration Client
Fig. 8: The MONDO Offline Collaboration Server: Ar-
chitecture
collaborators whenever their access is denied for a
certain file (which contains models).
Version-control
allows to the users to download the files by sending
a checkout event, submit their changes by sending
a commit event and update the files by sending an
update event.
Version check
checks the version of the files and sends upToDate
the collaborators whether the files are already up-to-
date upon an update or sends needToUpdate event
they need to update upon a rejected commit.
File-level locking
allows users to lock files by sending a lock event and
reject commits initiated by other users. They can
also remove their locks by sending an unlock event.
Handling Multiple Requests
allows users to initiate multiple requests simultane-
ously that the server can accept.
Final Notification
notifies the users about the result of their requested
operations by sending a success or a failure event.
As checkout and update operations of the collabo-
ration scheme are fully handled by Subversion, we need
to integrate the TPutBack and TGet into the commit op-
eration to enforce fine-grained access control and prop-
agate the changes.
Hooks are programs triggered by repository events
such as lock, unlock or commit. The hook may be set
up to be triggered before such an event (with the possi-
bility of influencing its outcome, e.g. cancelling it upon
failure) or directly afterwards (when the event is guar-
anteed to have happened).The following hook programs
will be executed upon a commit operation.
Pre-Commit Hook. TPutBack is invoked by pre-
commit hook executing when a user attempts to com-
mit a new revision of a model Mr
′
F (new revision r
′ of a
model MF ). This hook performs the following steps to
enforce access control policies corresponding to Fig. 9:
1. Parent revision MrF of M
r′
F is identified.
2. Revision MrF is traced to the corresponding revision
MRG in the gold repository.
3. The hook attempts to put a file-level lock to MG in
the gold repository.
(a) If the locking attempt fails, the hook terminates
sending an otherCommitUnderExecution event.
(b) Otherwise, the lock onMG is activated by send-
ing a lock and the hook continues its process.
4. TPutBack is executed between Mr
′q
F and M
R
G in the
gold repository, in order to reflect the changes per-
formed in the new commit.
(a) If the TPutBack detects any attempts to per-
form model modifications violating write per-
missions, then the commit process to the
front repository terminates by sending a
policyViolated event.
(b) Otherwise, the commit is deemed successful,
and MR”G is committed to the gold repository
(with metadata such as committer name and
commit message copied over from the original
front repository commit).
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Fig. 9: Pre-commit hook at the front repository
5. Finally, the hook finishes successfully and let the
VCS server to handle the request.
Post-Commit Hook. TGet is invoked by post-commit
hook synchronizing all front models MrF with the new
revision of gold model MR
′
G . This hook is triggered af-
ter a commit of MR
′
G finished successfully at the gold
repository and performs the following steps correspond
to Fig. 10 to propagate the new changes.
1. Parent revision MRG of M
R′
G is identified.
2. The hook iterates over each front repository and ex-
ecute the following steps. If the commit to the gold
repository is initiated by a front repository then the
originating front repository will be skipped.
(a) Revision MRG is traced to the corresponding
front revision MrF in the front repository.
(b) TGet is executed betweenMR′G andMrF in order
to reflect the changes performed in the commit.
If MrF does not exist, it is handled as an empty
model.
(c) New revision of the model Mr
′
F is commited
to the front repository (with metadata such as
committer name and commit message copied
over from the original front repository commit).
3. The hook removes the lock from MR
′
G by sending an
unlock event.
4. Finally, it finishes successfully and lets the VCS
server to handle the request.
6.1.3 Discussion
It is worth discussing the following properties of the
offline collaboration framework.
Generality. Our solution is general and adaptable
to any VCS that supports checkout, update, commit op-
erations (maybe they are named differently).
Fig. 10: Post-commit hook at the gold repository
Server Response. Users get response to their com-
mit right after the collaboration server attempts to
propagate back the changes to the gold repository. If
any access control rule is violated the pre-commit hook
fails. At the last phase of pre-commit, the VCS declines
the commit action to the gold repository, if any modi-
fied files are locked on the gold repository. Hence, the
hook fails again and prevent the VCS specific file level
locks. In contrast, if everything goes well the users do
not need to wait for synchronizing with the remaining
front repositories.
Multiple Models in a Commit. A single commit
may update several models at once. In this case, the
hooks are invoked for each model in the commit.
Non-blocking Commit. Commit operation does
not block update and checkout operations as previous
versions still readable in the front repositories.
Models stored among other project files. Our
solution supports storing models along with non-model
files in the repositories. The hooks can be parameterized
with file extensions to determine whether a file needs
to be handled as a model. When a file is not a model,
it is simply copied from the gold repository to the front
repositories.
Correspondence Relation. It is a challenging
task to identify the correspondences between model as-
sets of the front and gold models, where the models are
stored independently as it is addressed in C2.2.
Our approach currently uses specific attributes to
provide permanent identifiers. Such a permanent iden-
tifier is preserved across model revisions and lens map-
pings, and can therefore be used to pre-populate the
object correspondence relation. In our running exam-
ple, each object has a unique id attribute. Note that
unlike EMF, some modeling platforms (e.g. IFC [34])
automatically provide such permanent identifiers.
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While requiring permanent identifiers is a limita-
tion of the approach, it is only relevant for modeling
platforms that do not themselves provide this kind of
traceability, and only in the offline collaboration sce-
nario. Being able to identify model objects is a rela-
tively low barrier for modeling languages; e.g. the orig-
inal wind turbine language includes a unique identifier
for all model objects.
Authorization FilesWe have taken the design de-
cision that the authorization files are stored and ver-
sioned in the same VCS as the models. Thus policy
files may evolve naturally along with the evolution of
the contents of the repository.
Policy files are writable by superusers only, but read-
able by every user; this means that offline clients may
evaluate security rules on their offline copies themselves.
Note that we do not believe that this openness of the
security policy causes major security concerns, as secu-
rity by obscurity is not good security principal. In any
way, names and parameters of security rules should not
themselves contain sensitive design information.
6.2 Online Collaboration
In the online scenario, several users can simultaneously
display and edit the same model with short transac-
tions by using a web-based modeling tool where changes
are propagated immediately to other users during col-
laborative modeling sessions. In contrast to the offline
scenario, where users manipulated local copies of the
models, models are kept in a server memory and users
access the model directly on the server. The goal of
our approach in accordance with C3.1 is to incremen-
tally enforce fine-grained model access control rules and
on-the-fly change propagation between view models of
different users.
6.2.1 Technical Realization
During a collaborative modeling session, a model kept
in server memory for remote access may also be called a
whiteboard depicted in Fig. 11. The collaboration server
hosts a number of whiteboard sessions, each equipped
with a gold model. Each user connected to a whiteboard
is presented with their own front model, connected to
the gold model via a lens relationship. The front mod-
els are initially created using Get. If a user modifies
their front model, the changes are propagated to the
gold model using PutBack, and propagated further
to the other front models using Get again. In case
of online collaboration, these lens operations are con-
tinuously and efficiently executed as a live transforma-
Fig. 11: Overview of Online Collaboration
tion [18], thus users always see an up-to-date view of
the model during the editing session.
Similarly to modern collaborative editing tools
(such as Google Sheets [17]), whiteboards can be oper-
ated transparently: whenever the first user attempts to
open a given model, a new whiteboard is started; sub-
sequent users opening the model will join the existing
whiteboard. When all users have left, the whiteboard
can be disposed. The model may be persisted periodi-
cally, or on demand (“save button”). The session man-
ager component enables collaborators to start, join or
leave whiteboard sessions and persist models to disk.
6.2.2 Realization of the Collaboration Scheme
To achieve challenge 4.2, we need to discuss how the
online collaboration realizes the collaboration scheme.
1. The checkout operation is equivalent to joining the
whiteboard session for the first time, except it re-
quires to execute TGet that achieves the front model
on which the new user can work.
2. The update operation is equivalent to refresh the
browser on client side. Via web-based technologies,
the collaboration framework notifies and forces the
clients’ browsers to refresh when new changes are in-
troduced into their front models. However, manual
refresh usually results in an upToDate event, except
when the notification and the manual refresh initi-
ated at the same moment.
3. The commit operations are initiated right af-
ter users apply modifications on their front
models. Other clients need to wait (receiving
otherCommitUnderExecution event) until the com-
mit finishes, including the execution of PutBack
and all Get processes to propagate the changes.
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After a successful commit, clients receive notifica-
tion to force them to initiate and update. When a
policyViolated event occurs, the change is immedi-
ately rolled back at the initiator’s front model.
6.2.3 Discussion
It is worth discussing the following properties of the
online collaboration framework.
Conflicts Handling. As the online collaboration
operates with short transactions, it has only a small
chance that conflict occurs during the session (e.g. a
collaborator modifies an object that is deleted by an-
other collaborator and the propagation of the deletion
is under execution). However, if a conflict araises, it is
resolved by accepting the remote changes. It also im-
plies that the latter changes will be lost.
Blocking Checkout and Update. Version num-
bers are not considered in online collaboration and only
one gold model exists during a session. Hence, checkout
and update operations need to wait until the commit
operation finishes if these operations were initiated dur-
ing the execution of a commit.
Prototype User Interface. An initial user in-
terface is implemented as a proof-of-concept, depicted
in Fig. 12, that uses the editors automatically gener-
ated from EMF metamodels4 which also provides sim-
ilar modeling environment as the desktop Eclipse IDE.
This prototype tool is to demonstrate how to adapt
rule-based access control with bidirectional lenses to
the online collaboration scenario. We strongly believe
that several other existing tools such as GenMyModel
[6, 49,50] can easily adapt our solution.
Correspondence Relation. In the online case, the
gold and its front models are initiated for a collabora-
tion session. During a session, these models are stored
in the memory and there is no need to reload any of
them. Correspondences established during TGet can be
used through the online collaboration. Hence, there is
no limitation about the models (unlike in the offline
case, where unique identifiers are required).
Integration with Offline Collaboration. Mod-
els and authorization files can be persisted to an under-
lying gold repository provided by a VCS. The online
collaboration tool can access them using checkout/up-
date/commit commands. However, if file-level conflicts
occur in the underlying VCS, they will need specific user
interfaces to resolve them. Instead, we decided that new
whiteboard sessions put file-level locks on the resources
related to the models to prevent conflicts in the VCS
upon persisting.
4 EMF and RAP integration: https://wiki.eclipse.org/
RAP/EMF_Integration
Fig. 12: User Interface for Online Collaboration Proto-
type
6.3 Assumptions and Limitations
6.3.1 Feedback on Write Access Control
As discussed before, the means of write access control is
the following. In the offline case, the server rejects unau-
thorized modifications only when the user finally sub-
mits them. In the online case, PutBack is a live trans-
formation, and it can immediately reject non-compliant
changes. (Note that rejected write attempts offer a side
channel through which some information on the hidden
parts of the gold model may be gained. While it is be-
side the point here, policy designers are advised to take
such unintended effects into account.)
It can be frustrating and unproductive for users to
learn about their insufficient permissions by trial and
error. This is especially true in the offline case, where
the feedback only arrives when modifications are actu-
ally committed. In a better system, write restrictions
would be readily available to the user; advanced mod-
eling tools may even incorporate this information into
their model notation, e.g. to visually show read-only
parts of the model as frozen.
However, such a tight feedback loop in the offline
case would either require nonstandard communication
channels (with their own security risks) to disclose the
evaluated permission sets with the client; or alterna-
tively, additional computations such as client-side ap-
proximation of the policy queries based on the incom-
plete information in the front model. Proposing a sat-
isfactory solution is left as future work, e.g. by elabo-
rating initial ideas of [15].
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Motivated by the review, we have rephrased this
entire subsection to better emphasise what the ac-
tual claims are, what limitations we see, and how we
hope to address them in the future.
6.3.2 Ordered Lists
In EMF, some multi-valued references and attributes
are ordered lists. Model assets introduced in Sec. 3.1 col-
lectively represent all knowledge contained in an EMF
model except for ordering information. Thus the lack
of ordered lists is a limitation of the proposed solution.
The core reason is that there is no unique way to pro-
vide PutBack for ordered lists that have been filtered;
therefore such a lens would necessarily violate at least
Prop. 7 and undoability. Finding an acceptable resolu-
tion of the problem (e.g. imposing a limitation that,
for each user, ordered lists must be read-only unless
entirely visible) is left as future work. For now, the pro-
posed solution works properly for unordered collections.
6.3.3 Central Authority
Note that both G2 and G3 assume a central reposi-
tory (owned by e.g. a system integrator) where the en-
tire model is available. In a more general case, no single
entity would be in possession of complete knowledge.
There is an algebra [23] for combining lens transfor-
mations in various ways, suggesting a promising path
for addressing this issue in future research. However,
such a distributed scenario is out of scope for this pa-
per; we address the centralized case, which is by far
the most common in access control approaches used in
model repositories.
7 Evaluation
We have carried out a scalability measurement in both
offline and online scenario over the Wind Turbine case
study [7] of the MONDO FP7 project. We state the
following research questions in the evaluation:
Online Collaboration
Q1 Is the change propagation is incremental as it is
requested in challenge C3.1?
Q1.1 How scalable is our approach to increasing
model size?
Q1.2 How scalable is our approach to increasing
number of active users?
Offline Collaboration
Q2What is the overhead of using query-based access
control over an existing VCS?
Q2.1 How scalable is our approach to increasing
model size?
Q2.2 How scalable is our approach to increasing
number of front repositories?
Q2.3 How scalable is our approach to increasing size
of committed changes?
Finally, Sec. 6.3 will discuss limitations of our solution.
7.1 Scalability Evaluation
7.1.1 Measurement Setup
For the measurement, we used the simplified metamodel
of Fig. 2 depicted in Fig. 13 which has slight modi-
fications. The control unit types were abstracted to
a string attribute, with K different permitted values
to provide K different specialist, and the attributes of
signals are removed. The corresponding access control
rules are similar to our motivating example Sec. 2, with
one specialist engineer for each control unit type (each
having five access control rules dedicated to them) and
an additional system administrator user who has read
and write permission for the entire model. This means
altogether K + 1 users and 5K + 5 access control rules
as it is shown in Fig. 14.
Measurements were performed with gold instance
models of various size. The model of size M contains a
root Composite object, which contains M copies of the
structure depicted in Fig. 15. This means 1+M compos-
ite modules, 2M control units, 8M signals where 3M
of them are confidential and 14M+M references where
4M of them are consumes cross-references. The copies
are not completely identical: the vendor attributes are
set to a different value in each copy; and type as well as
cycle attributes of control units were chosen randomly
from their respective ranges with uniform distribution.
However, special care was taken to ensure that all con-
trol unit types must occur at least once; this also implies
2M ≥ K.
The measurement was performed with U ≤ K spe-
cialist users and the system administrator being present
(thus in total U + 1 front models).
Online case. To test the incremental behavior of
the lens transformation addressed by Q1, we measured
the time it took the system administrator to perform
a complex model manipulation operation on his front
model, and to propagate the changes to the front mod-
els of all users who can see it. The measured com-
plex operation is a signal reversal (depicted in Fig. 16),
which reverts the direction of a communication channels
by changing the provides and consumes to the opposite.
We have selected this representative operation since
(a) it involves adding and removing cross-references and
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Fig. 13: Modified Metamodel of Wind Turbine
Fig. 14: Users and active user in the measurement setup
Fig. 15: Core structure of synthesized models
a rearrangement of the containment hierarchy; (b) it
does not change the size of the model, thus introduces
no bias of this kind; (c) the change is noticeable by all
users that can see at least one of the involved modules
in their front models; and (d) every access control rule
in the policy (except for hiding the vendor attribute)
plays a role in determining the impact of the change.
Offline case. The measurement focuses on the over-
head of the collaboration framework required for prop-
agating a change in the front model addressed by Q2.
We measured the time it took a specific specialist to
(1) propagate several number of complex model ma-
nipulation operation on her front model to the gold
model and (2) from the gold model to the remaining
front models of all users who can see the effect of the
Fig. 16: Signal Reversal Operation
changes. The former describes the response time that a
user has to wait for receiving the result (success/failure)
of her commit while the latter is the propogation time to
propogate changes to the other front repositories. The
measured complex operation is a signal addition (de-
picted in Fig. 17), which adds a new signal under the
root object.
We have selected this representative operation since
(a) it demonstrates that any number of new changes
can be introduced into the model; (b) it increases the
model size but always with constant-size addition; (c)
all the users can see the change in their front model; and
(d) every access control rule in the policy (except for
hiding the vendor attribute) plays a role in determining
the impact of the change.
Fig. 17: Signal Addition Operation
Hardware Configuration
All the measurements5 executed on a personal com-
puter6. with maximum a 7GB of Java heap size.
7.1.2 Measurements of Online case
In the model size scalability series, we used
– fixed number of K = 50 control unit types and U =
10 present collaborators
– with increasing size of the model ranging from M =
50 to M = 700 (7701 objects, 10500 references)
In the active users scalability series, we used
– fixed number of K = 100 control unit types and
model of size M = 200 (2301 objects, 3100 refer-
ences),
5 Raw data and reproduction instructions at https://
tinyurl.com/sosym-access-control
6 CPU: Intel Core i7-4700MQ@2.40GHz, MEM: 8GB
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Fig. 18: Average execution time of an online signal re-
versal (increasing model size)
– with the increasing number of specialist collaborators
joining the session ranging from U = 2 to U = 100.
For accuracy, 100 reversal operations were carried
out and their execution times averaged in a single run;
we have plotted the median execution time of 10 runs,
excluding 2 warm-up runs, with 1 standard deviation
error bars.
The results of the model size scalability series are shown
in Fig. 18 addressing Q1.1. The cost of performing a sin-
gle reversal model manipulation is low, and seems to be
independent from the model size. This confirms that we
have achieved incrementality where computation cost is
dependent on the size of the change, but not on the size
of the entire model.
The results of the active users scalability series are
shown in Fig. 19 addressing Q1.2. It is apparent that
when very few users join the session, most signal rever-
sals are not visible to any user other than the principal
engineer; but as more and more specialist users join
the session, the number of active users starts to dom-
inate the cost of model manipulation. Asymptotically,
the cost of model manipulation is proportional to the
average number of front models it is propagated to.
Note that it has only a small chance that users con-
currently modify their front model as we mentioned in
Sec. 6.2.3, but in that case the operations which arrive
later to the server will be rejected. Hence, concurrent
modifications have no additional effect on the perfor-
mance.
Concurrent users are replaced with active users and
a reason is introduced why concurrent users does
not cause performance issues.
7.1.3 Measurements of Offline case
In the model size scalability series, we used
– fixed number of K = 100 control unit types, Fr = 20
front repositories and Ch = 10 changes,
– where the model is increased from M = 100 to M =
6000 (34001 objects, 45000 references).
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Fig. 19: Average execution time of an online signal re-
versal (increasing the number of active users)
In the number of front repository scalability series, we
used
– fixed number of K = 100 control unit types, model
of size M = 800 (8801 objects, 12000 references) and
Ch = 10 changes,
– where the number of front repositories is increased
from Fr = 5 to Fr = 100.
In the change size scalability series, we used
– fixed number of K = 100 control unit types, model
of size M = 400 and Fr = 20 front repositories,
– where the number of introduced changes is increased
from Ch = 10 to Ch = 1000.
The measurements were executed 10 times with 2
warm-up execution in separate JVM and the results
show the median of the measured values.
The charts represent the entire transformation time in-
cluding the following tasks: (1) loading the EMF mod-
els, (2)initializing the lens by building the correspon-
dence tables, (3) loading the additional files such as
rules and queries, (4) executing the transformation and
(5) finally serializing the results as a committable new
version of the models.
The lower part of the bars (denoted by checkered
blue background) represents response time including
the PutBack phase of the transformation. This is the
delay experienced by committing users before they re-
ceive their response from the server so that they can
continue their work. The upper part of the bars (in solid
blue color) visualizes propagation time of the changes to
synchronize with the rest of the front repositories (this
happens asynchronously from the point of view of the
committing user).
The results of model size scalability series are shown
in Fig. 20 addressing Q2.1. In case of the largest model,
users should wait at most 10 seconds to commit their
changes in addition to the default execution time of a
commit in the version control system. Response time
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Fig. 20: Average execution time of an offline signal ad-
dition (increasing model size)
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Fig. 21: Average execution time of an offline signal ad-
dition (increasing number of front repositories)
grows linearly with the size of the model while synchro-
nization is non-linear to the model size.
The results of number of front repository scalability
series are shown in Fig. 21 addressing Q2.2. In case of
our special signal addition change, all front repositories
had to be updated to propagate the changes and the
same number of modification had to be executed on
those front models. The results clearly show that the
execution time grows linearly to the number of front
repositories to which the change has to be propagated.
The results of the third series are shown in Fig. 22
addressing Q2.3. It shows that loading the models and
building the correspondence table dominate the execu-
tion time in case of small changes. However, the execu-
tion time grows linearly with the size of changes in case
of large commits (e.g. from 1000), for the sole reason
that the resulting model size itself is increased due to
the addition of so many new signals.
7.1.4 Discussion on Performance Findings
As seen from the measurements, the overhead on the
commit time experienced by a committer in the offline
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Fig. 22: Average execution time of an offline signal ad-
dition (increasing number of changes)
scenario is manageable, but can easily reach several sec-
onds for larger models with tens of thousands of ele-
ments. This time is still significantly shorter than typi-
cal build and test execution times in continuous integra-
tion solutions, so our access control service is unlikely
to form the bottleneck of developer productivity. Note
that while the implementation of our prototype could
certainly be improved, it will always have an overhead
that is at least proportional to the model size, since the
entire new model file has to be read and processed upon
each commit (no matter how small the change within
that model). This is a characteristic of file-based offline
collaboration (required to meet goal G2).
One way to get around this limitation is to use on-
line collaboration instead, where the execution time
overhead on model modification is very low, even for
a few dozen simultaneous collaborators. This can be
seen as a space-time tradeoff, as online collaboration
uses in-memory models, putting a limit on the amount
of online sessions and participants that a given server
can support. We therefore recommend the adaptation of
online collaboration whenever possible for models that
are currently under very active development, and us-
ing the file-based offline interface for other cases, such
as accessing rarely updated models, old revisions, side
branches, and of course for working on a disconnected
computer.
8 Related Work
In this section, we collect the state-of-the-art ap-
proaches for specifying and enforcing fine-grained ac-
cess control over various technological domains, and
compare it to our solution.
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8.1 Fine-grained Policies in Various Domains
8.1.1 File-based Access Control.
Traditional version control systems (like CVS, SVN)
and file sharing technologies adopt file-level access poli-
cies, which are clearly insufficient for fine-grained access
control specifications.
Off-the-shelf file systems typically require resources
(files and folders) to be explicitly labeled with per-
missions that take the form of an Access Control List
(ACL), or the simplified form user/group/other flags.
An ACL consists of entries regarding which user/sub-
ject is granted or denied permission for a given opera-
tion.
File-based solutions can be directly applied to MDE,
but cannot provide fine-grained access control, where
different parts of a model file have different permis-
sions. Our policies are fine-grained, use implicit rules
(so that model elements do not have to be explicitly
annotated with permission flags, which is difficult to
manually maintain as the model evolves), and respect
internal consistency (such as permission dependencies
of cross-references); all the while being more flexible [20]
in the conflict resolution method.
8.1.2 Access Control in RDF Triple/Quad stores.
Graph-based access control is a popular strategy for
many triple and quad stores (4store [31], Virtuoso , IBM
DB2) developed for storing large RDF data. User priv-
ileges can be granted to for each named graph while ac-
cess control is actually checked when issuing a SPARQL
query. Denial of access for a graph filters the query re-
sults obtained from this specific graph. Data access in
AllegroGraph [28] can be controlled on the database or
catalog level (coarse-grained) as well as on the graph
and triple level (fine-grained) while Stardog only allows
database-level access control.
Similarly to our approach, fine-grained access con-
trol is discussed in [22] using graph queries as precon-
ditions of rules to select certain assets on which the
permissions need to be enforced. The major difference
is that we apply queries in an MDE environment (this
has very important implications relative to RDF, see
Sec. 3.1), and we also provide offline collaboration.
In the Oracle Database Semantic Technologies [42],
access control is carried out by default on the model
(graph) level. Furthermore, it can be configured on
the triple (row) level, which is implemented by query
rewriting. In this case, the definition of access control
policies is based on so-called match and apply (graph)
patterns, where the former identifies the type of access
restriction while the latter injects access-control specific
constraints to the query.
Another access control technique is called label based
security, which offers (1) triple-level control using (a
hierarchy of) sensitivity labels attached to each triple,
and (2) RDF resource-level access control for subjec-
t/predicate/object. Explicit data access labels are im-
plemented in [42] and are generalized into abstract to-
kens and operators in [43].
8.1.3 Access Control for XML Documents.
A number of standards such as XACML [33] (OASIS
standard) provide fine-grained access control for XML
documents. These type of documents are similar to
models in a way, that they consists of nodes with at-
tributes that may contain other nodes. XACML pro-
vides several combining algorithms to select from con-
tradicting policies. In [29], fine-grained access control
is formalized using XPath for XML documents, which
claims that the visibility of a node depends on its ances-
tors, thus when a node is granted access, then access is
also granted to its descendants. However, other depen-
dencies are not discussed related to XML Documents.
Similarly to our approach, a dedicated policy lan-
guage is used by [40], from which a lens is automatically
generated to enforce access control for XML documents.
In addition to the attributes and context of the assets
(XML nodes), the XQuery-based policy can take into
account external (subject or context) attributes as well.
As it is not an MDE approach, there is no treatment
of cross-references. There is no discussion of internal
consistency either (see Sec. 3.2), except for the con-
tainment hierarchy, which is relevant for XML as well.
Finally, there is no discussion of the challenges of online
and offline collaboration.
8.1.4 Access control in Collaborative Modeling
Environments.
Currently, fine-grained access control is not considered
in the state of the art tools of MDE such as MetaEdit+
[53], VirtualEMF [16], WebGME [38], EMFStore [50],
GenMyModel [6], Obeo Designer Team [41], MDE-
Forge [9] or the tools developed according to [30]. See
also the broader survey in [44].
The generic framework CDO [49] (used e.g. in [41])
provides both online collaboration and role-based access
control with type-specific (class, package and resource-
level) permissions, but no facility for instance level ac-
cess control policy specifications. However, there is a
pluggable access control mechanism that can specify
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access on the object level; it should be possible to inte-
grate fine-grained solutions such as the currently pro-
posed system.
The collaborative hardware design platform Vehi-
cleFORGE stores their model in graph-based databases
and has an access control scheme TrustForge [19] that
uses an implementation of KeyNote [13] trust manage-
ment system. This system is responsible for evaluating
the request addressed to the database, which can be
configured in various ways. It supports unlimited per-
mission levels and it is also able to handle consistency
constraints by adding them as assertions. Conflict reso-
lution strategies are not discussed. AToMPM [48] pro-
vides fine-grained role-based access control for online
collaboration; no offline scenario or query-based secu-
rity is supported, though. Access control is provided
at elementary manipulation level (RESTful services) in
the online collaboration solution of [25].
8.2 Access Control Enforcement
8.2.1 Access control using Model Transformation.
Closest to our approach, [39] uses model transforma-
tions to build infrastructures that can manage access
control policies written in any policy language. It means
that their approach takes a policy model as input and
derives transformation rules to enforce read and write
permissions. To compare it to our solution, we use el-
ementary model transformation rules that take the ef-
fective permissions as input, instead of integrating the
permissions into our rules.
8.2.2 Model-driven Security.
Model-based techniques have also been used for access
control purposes. In [36], similarly to our solution, ac-
cess control is enforced at runtime by program code
that has been automatically generated from a model-
based specification, which captures both system and
security policy descriptions. This technique can pro-
vide runtime checks only on single entities by using the
guarded object design pattern. A similar approach is
suggested by [14], which specifies access control policies
by OCL. Although this idea enables the formulation of
queries that involve several objects, the efficient check-
ing of these complex structural queries highly depends
on the algorithmic experience of the system designer
due to the fact that OCL handles model navigation in
an imperative style, in contrast to declarative graph
patterns, where several sophisticated pattern matching
algorithms are readily available.
The book chapter [37] about Model-driven Security
provides a detailed survey of a wide range of MDE
approaches for designing secure systems, but does not
cover the security of the MDE process itself.
8.2.3 Access Control using Bidirectional Programming.
Bidirectional Programming (BP) is an approach for
defining lenses concisely, e.g. by only specifying one of
Get and PutBack, and deriving the other. Such lenses
can be directly applied for read filtering. However, [27]
demonstrates that conventional BP is not sufficient for
write access control. It also proposes such an integrity-
preserving BP extension, focusing on string transfor-
mations (and therefore not directly applicable in MDE).
There is no notion of access control policy either, so the
security engineer has to develop their own lens trans-
formation to implement access control.
9 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we aimed to uniformly enhance secure
collaborative modeling by using fine-grained access con-
trol policies uniformly for online and offline collabora-
tion scenarios. Each collaborator can access a dedicated
copy of the model in accordance with read permissions
of the policy. Moreover, bidirectional transformations
are used to synchronize changes between different col-
laborators and check that write permissions are also
respected.
We illustrated our techniques in the context of a
Wind Turbine case study from the MONDO European
Project, which was also used to assess scalability with
models of increasing size, increasing change introduced
by collaborators and increasing number of collabora-
tors. In case of online collaboration, the results were
promising with close to instant propagation of changes
and checking of write permissions. In case of offline col-
laboration, the results show that the response time is
acceptable and the overhead is less than 10 additional
seconds for the largest model).
As future work, we would like to (i) address the lim-
itations presented in Sec. 6.3, (ii) investigate the pos-
sibilities of building correspondence relations between
the original model and filtered copy of it dedicated to a
certain collaborator, and (iii) realize our collaboration
scheme with other frameworks (e.g. Git, GenMyModel)
and with support for continuous integration and review
/ change request management systems.
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A Get Transformation Rules
rule Subtractive Get Reference Priority 1
Precondition :: (MG(OAG,RAG,AAG),MF (OAF ,RAF ,AAF ), permissionEff)→ {ReferenceAsset}
{ReferenceAsset(sF , ref, tF )|ReferenceAsset(sF , ref, tF ) ∈ RAF ,
∃ObjectAsset(sF , ts) ∈ OAF ,ObjectAsset(tF , tT ) ∈ OAF : trace(ObjectAsset(sG, ts)) = ObjectAsset(sF , ts),
trace(ObjectAsset(tG, tt)) = ObjectAsset(tF , tt), ̸ ∃ReferenceAsset(sG, ref, tG) : ReferenceAsset(sG, ref, tG) ∈ RAG
permissionEff(ReferenceAsset(sG, ref, tG), read) ̸= deny}
Action
RAF := RAF \ {ReferenceAsset(sF , ref, tF )}
rule Subtractive Get Attribute Priority 2
Precondition :: (MG(OAG,RAG,AAG),MF (OAF ,RAF ,AAF ), permissionEff)→ {AttributeAsset}
{AttributeAsset(oF , attr, v′)|AttributeAsset(oF , attr, v′) ∈ AAF , ∃ObjectAsset(oF , t) : ObjectAsset(oF , t) ∈ OAF
∃ObjectAsset(oG, t) : ObjectAsset(oG, t) ∈ OAG, trace(ObjectAsset(oG, t)) = ObjectAsset(oF , t), ̸ ∃AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v) :
v′ =
{
v, permissionEff(AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v), read) = allow
obf(v), permissionEff(AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v), read) = obfuscate
,AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v) ∈ AAG}
Action
AAF := AAF \ {AttributeAsset(oF , attr, v′)}
rule Subtractive Get Object Priority 3
Precondition :: (MG(OAG,RAG,AAG),MF (OAF ,RAF ,AAF ), permissionEff)→ {ObjectAsset}
{ObjectAsset(oF , t)|ObjectAsset(oF , t) ∈ OAF , ̸ ∃ObjectAsset(oG, t′) : trace(ObjectAsset(oG, t′)) = ObjectAsset(oF , t), t = t′
permissionEff(ObjectAsset(oG, t
′), read) ̸= deny}
Action
OAF := OAF \ {ObjectAsset(oF , t)}, trace \ObjectAsset(oG, t′)|trace(ObjectAsset(oG, t′)) = ObjectAsset(oF , t)
rule Additive Get Object Priority 4
Precondition :: (MG(OAG,RAG,AAG),MF (OAF ,RAF ,AAF ), permissionEff)→ {ObjectAsset}2
{ObjectAsset(oG, t),ObjectAsset(oF , t′)|ObjectAsset(oG, t) ∈ OAG, permissionEff(ObjectAsset(oG, t), read) ̸= deny,
̸ ∃ObjectAsset(oF , t′) ∈ OAF : trace(ObjectAsset(oG, t)) = ObjectAsset(oF , t′), t = t′}
Action
OAF := OAF ∪ {ObjectAsset(oF , t′)}, trace(ObjectAsset(oG, t)) := ObjectAsset(oF , t′)
rule Additive Get Attribute Priority 5
Precondition :: (MG(OAG,RAG,AAG),MF (OAF ,RAF ,AAF ), permissionEff)→ {AttributeAsset}
{AttributeAsset(oF , attr, v′)|AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v) ∈ AAG, permissionEff(AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v), read) ̸= deny,
∃ObjectAsset(oF , t) : ObjectAsset(oF , t) ∈ AAF , trace(ObjectAsset(oG, t)) = ObjectAsset(oF , t), ̸ ∃AttributeAsset(oF , attr, v′) :
v′ =
{
v, permissionEff(AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v), read) = allow
obf(v), permissionEff(AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v), read) = obfuscate
,AttributeAsset(oF , attr, v
′) ∈ AAF }
Action
AAF := AAF ∪ {AttributeAsset(oF , attr, v′)}
rule Additive Get Reference Priority 6
Precondition :: (MG(OAG,RAG,AAG),MF (OAF ,RAF ,AAF ), permissionEff)→ {ReferenceAsset}
{ReferenceAsset(sF , ref, tF )|ReferenceAsset(sG, ref, tG) ∈ RAG, permissionEff(ReferenceAsset(sG, ref, tG), read) ̸= deny,
∃ObjectAsset(sG, ts),ObjectAsset(tG, tt) : trace(ObjectAsset(sG, ts)) = ObjectAsset(sF , ts),
trace(ObjectAsset(tG, tt)) = ObjectAsset(tF , tt), ̸ ∃ReferenceAsset(sF , ref, tF ) : ReferenceAsset(sF , ref, tF ) ∈ RAF }
Action
RAF := RAF ∪ {ReferenceAsset(sF , ref, tF )}
Enforcing Fine-grained Access Control for Secure Collaborative Modeling using Bidirectional Transformations 31
B PutBack Transformation Rules
rule Subtractive PutBack Reference Priority 1
Precondition :: (MG(OAG,RAG,AAG),MF (OAF ,RAF ,AAF ), permissionEff)→ {ReferenceAsset}
{ReferenceAsset(sG, ref, tG)|ReferenceAsset(sG, ref, tG) ∈ RAG, permissionEff(ReferenceAsset(sG, ref, tG), read) ̸= deny,
∃ObjectAsset(sG, ts),ObjectAsset(tG, tt) : trace(ObjectAsset(sG, ts)) = ObjectAsset(sF , ts),
trace(ObjectAsset(tG, tt)) = ObjectAsset(tF , tt), ̸ ∃ReferenceAsset(sF , ref, tF ) : ReferenceAsset(sF , ref, tF ) ∈ RAF }
Action
If permissionEff(ReferenceAsset(sG, ref, tG), write) ̸= deny then RAG := RAG \ ReferenceAsset(sG, ref, tG) else ↘↙
rule Subtractive PutBack Attribute Priority 2
Precondition :: (MG(OAG,RAG,AAG),MF (OAF ,RAF ,AAF ), permissionEff)→ {AttributeAsset}
{AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v)| ̸ ∃AttributeAsset(oF , attr, v′) :
∃ObjectAsset(oF , t) : ObjectAsset(oF , t) ∈ OAF , trace(ObjectAsset(oG, t)) = ObjectAsset(oF , t),
v =
{
v′, permissionEff(AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v), read) = allow
obf−1(v′), permissionEff(AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v), read) = obfuscate
,AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v) ∈ AAG}
Action
If permissionEff(AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v), write) ̸= deny then AAG := AAG \ AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v) else ↘↙
rule Subtractive PutBack Object Priority 3
Precondition :: (MG(OAG,RAG,AAG),MF (OAF ,RAF ,AAF ), permissionEff)→ {ObjectAsset}
{ObjectAsset(oG, t)|ObjectAsset(oG, t) ∈ OAG, permissionEff(ObjectAsset(oG, t), read) ̸= deny,
̸ ∃ObjectAsset(oF , t′) : trace(ObjectAsset(oG, t)) = ObjectAsset(oF , t′), t = t′}
Action
If permissionEff(ObjectAsset(oG, type), write) ̸= deny then
OAG := OAG \ObjectAsset(oG, t), trace \ObjectAsset(oG, t)|trace(ObjectAsset(oG, t)) = ObjectAsset(oF , t) else ↘↙
rule Additive PutBack Object Priority 4
Precondition :: (MG(OAG,RAG,AAG),MF (OAF ,RAF ,AAF ), permissionEff)→ {ObjectAsset}2
{ObjectAsset(oF , t),ObjectAsset(oG, t)|ObjectAsset(oF , t) ∈ OAF , ̸ ∃ObjectAsset(oG, t) : trace(ObjectAsset(oG, t)) = ObjectAsset(oF , t)}
Action
OAG := OAG ∪ {ObjectAsset(oG, t)}
If permissionEff(ObjectAsset(oG, t), write) ̸= deny then trace(ObjectAsset(oG, t)) := ObjectAsset(oF , t) else ↘↙
rule Additive PutBack Attribute Priority 5
Precondition :: (MG(OAG,RAG,AAG),MF (OAF ,RAF ,AAF ), permissionEff)→ {AttributeAsset}
{AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v)|AttributeAsset(oF , attr, v′) ∈ AAF , ∃ObjectAsset(oF , t) : ObjectAsset(oF , t) ∈ AAF
∃ObjectAsset(oG, t) : ObjectAsset(oG, t) ∈ OAG, trace(ObjectAsset(oG, t)) = ObjectAsset(oF , t), ̸ ∃AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v) :
v =
{
v′, permissionEff(AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v), read) = allow
obf−1(v′), permissionEff(AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v), read) = obfuscate
,AttributeAsset(oG, attr, v) ∈ AAG}
Action
AAG := AAG ∪ {AttributeAsset(oG, att, v)}
If (permissionEff(AttributeAsset(oG, att, v), write) = deny) then ↘↙
rule Additive PutBack Reference Priority 6
Precondition :: (MG(OAG,RAG,AAG),MF (OAF ,RAF ,AAF ), permissionEff)→ {ReferenceAsset}
{ReferenceAsset(sG, ref, tG)|ReferenceAsset(sF , ref, tF ) ∈ RAF ,
∃ObjectAsset(sF , ts),ObjectAsset(tF , tt) ∈ OAF : trace(ObjectAsset(sG, ts)) = ObjectAsset(sF , ts),
trace(ObjectAsset(tG, tt)) = ObjectAsset(tF , tt), ̸ ∃ReferenceAsset(sG, ref, tG) : ReferenceAsset(sG, ref, tG) ∈ RAG}
Action
RAG := RAG ∪ {ReferenceAsset(sG, ref, tG)}
If permissionEff(ReferenceAsset(sG, ref, tG), write) = deny then ↘↙
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C Proof sketches for the transformation properties listed in Sec. 4.3.1
Proof for Prop. 1: Termination
In the following, by source model we will mean the front model in case of PutBack, and the readable part of the gold model
in case of Get. Note that in both cases, the set of assets contained in the source model, defined this way, is not modified during a
transformation run.
Then we prove that for any given asset, either the additive or the subtractive rule may fire during a transformation run, but not
both. This follows from the fact that the precondition of the additive rule requires the presence of the asset in the source model, while
the subtractive rule requires its absence, and the source model does not change.
Note that the main action of each rule directly invalidates its precondition: additive rules always check for the non-existence of the
asset to be created in the target model, while subtractive rules always check for the existence of the asset to be removed in the target
model. Also, this main effect could only be possibly undone by the opposite rule (additive for subtractive and vice versa), which was
shown above not to fire during the same transformation run. Therefore a rule, once fired for a given precondition match, will not fire
again for the same match in the same transformation run.
Finally, on a source model of finite size, the preconditions of the rules have a finite number of matches, thus all the rule executions
during a transformation run may be characterized by a finite number of distinct matches. As each precondition match is fired at
most once, the transformation run must consist of a finite number of rule firings. It is trivial to see that individual rule actions are
terminating.
Note that this proof, unlike the following ones, does not rely on Asm. 1; so the transformations can at least be known to terminate
even when the conditions of regularity are not met.
Proof for Prop. 2: Confluence
Here we follow a proof strategy and terminology common in rewriting systems (see e.g. [24] for graph transformations). The proof
will rely on both the above result for termination as well as Asm. 1.
First of all, our rules are sequentially independent, meaning that if there are two valid transformation runs that differ only by
swapping two subsequent rule executions, then the end result of the two runs are the same. This is easily seen by examining the
actions of the rules. Note in our case, because of the priority-based total ordering of rules, it is sufficient to check different precondition
matches of the same rule, as no other rules are on the same priority level, making them unswappable.
Next, we also establish that the rules are parallel independent, meaning that if there are two distinct preconditions matches of
the same priority (i.e. the same rule in our case), then firing the rule for one will never disable the other. For Get, this is also easily
checked by inspecting the rules. For PutBack, however, we must take into account that with changes to the gold model, the effective
permissions may also change. This is indeed a point where confluence could fail; but Asm. 1 guarantees that this does not happen. A
further violation of parallel independence is caused by PutBack failing and stopping execution when a write permission check fails; in
this case if we can pretend that this failure is registered, the transformation continues, and then only rejects the modification (rolling
back all effects) once it has terminated.
Parallel independence guarantees that if a rule application is enabled at some point, it will stay enabled until it is fired, and
therefore it will eventually be fired in a comlpete transformation run. The two kinds of independence together prove that any two
complete transformation runs (from the same starting model) terminate with equivalent results, as in [24].
We have shown that the transformations are terminating and confluent rule systems; from here on, we rely on this observation,
and treat the transformations induced by the rules as deterministic Get and PutBack functions.
Proof for Prop. 3: Confidentiality
The rule-based formalisation and the partitioning of assets based on permissions (made possible due to Asm. 1) makes it very
straightforward to prove security properties.
It is easy to check that Get rules create assets in the front model only if they are readable, and will definitely remove them if
they exist but are unreadable. A slight clarification needs to be made for obfuscated assets, that are not copied verbatim, but rather
undergo an obfuscating transformation in the appropriate rules.
PutBack does not modify the front model.
Proof for Prop. 4: Integrity
A successful PutBack run only creates or removes assets in the gold model if they are writeable. Get does not modify the gold
model, neither does a failed PutBack.
Proof for Prop. 5: GetPut
At the point where Get terminates, there are no matches for any of its preconditions. The goal is to prove that at this state,
PutBack has no matches either.
As shown for Prop. 3, the front model at this point contains exactly those gold assets that are readable by the user (modulo
obfuscation). It is easy to check that subtractive PutBack preconditions will only match if there is a readable asset that is in the gold
model but not in the front model, while (almost, but not perfectly symmetrically) additive PutBack preconditions will only match if
there is an asset in the front model that is not in the gold model; none of which can be satisfied in such a state.
Proof for Prop. 6: PutGet
At the point where a successful PutBackterminates, there are no matches for any of its preconditions. The goal is to prove that
at this state, Get has no matches either.
A quick review of PutBack rules reveal that the front and gold models must agree (at least) on all readable assets at this point
(modulo obfuscation), otherwise there would be precondition matches. It then follows trivially that Get preconditions cannot be
satisfied in such a state.
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Proof for Prop. 7: PutPut
As discussed before, this law is very restrictive, and it might have to be given up in order to allow for certain sensible extensions.
Nevertheless, here we will prove that this property holds for the system as presented in this paper.
Thanks to Asm. 1, assets can be partitioned into a writeable part and its complement, in line with the constant complement [8]
approach. It can be easily checked that all PutBack rules ensure that the changed asset is writeable; none of them affects the
complement (this is the part that no longer holds once dangle permissions are introduced).
We have also established above that after a successful PutBack, the front and gold models must agree (at least) on all readable
assets; consequently they also agree on all writeable assets, which is a subset of the former.
Since PutBack leaves the complement constant and overwrites the writeable part of the gold model with the front model, it
follows that in a sequence of successful PutBack runs, only the final one matters.
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D Collaboration Scheme Formalized as Communicating Sequential Processes
Algorithm 1 Collaboration Scheme Formalized as Communicating Sequential Processes
Range = 1..N
channel commit, update, checkout, needToUpdate, accessDenied, otherCommitUnderExecution, policyViolated, upToDate, failure,
success, lock, unlock, putback, get: Range
Checkout(x) = checkout.x → (success.x → SKIP □ accessDenied.x → failure.x → SKIP)
Update(x) = update.x→ (success.x→ SKIP □ accessDenied.x→ failure.x→ SKIP □ upToDate.x→ failure.x→ SKIP)
Pre-commitsucc(x) = commit.x → lock.x → SKIP
Pre-commitfail(x) = commit.x → (accessDenied.x → failure.x → SKIP □ needToUpdate.x → failure.x → SKIP)
Pre-commitreject(x) = commit.x → otherCommitUnderExecution.x → SKIP
Commitsucc(x) = putback.x → success.x SKIP
Commitfail(x) = policyViolated.x → failure.x → SKIP
Post-commitsync(x, z) = if x ̸= z get.x → SKIP else SKIP
Post-commitsucc(x) = unlock.x → SKIP
Post-commitfail(x) = unlock.x → SKIP
Serveridle() = □ y:Range @ Checkout(y); Serveridle()
□ Update(y); Serveridle()
□ Pre-commitsucc(y); Serverlocked(y)
□ Pre-commitfail(y) ; Serveridle()
Serverlocked(x) = □ y:Range @ Checkout(y); Serverlocked(x)
□ Update(y); Serverlocked(x)
□ Pre-commitreject(y); Serverlocked(x)
□ Commitsucc(x); Server
sync
unlocked(x, 1)
□ Commitfail(x) ; Serverlocked(x)
Serversyncunlocked(x, z) = □ y:Range @ Checkout(y); Server
sync
unlocked(x)
□ Update(y); Serversyncunlocked(x)
□ Pre-commitreject(y); Server
sync
unlocked(x)
□ Post-commitsync(x, z); if z ̸= N then Serversyncunlocked(x, z + 1) else Serversuccunlocked(x)
Serversuccunlocked(x) = □ y:Range @ Checkout(y); Server
succ
unlocked(x)
□ Update(y); Serversuccunlocked(x)
□ Pre-commitreject(y); Server
succ
unlocked(x)
□ Post-commitsucc(x); Serveridle()
Serverfailunlocked(x) = □ y:Range @ Checkout(y); Server
fail
unlocked(x)
□ Update(y); Serverfailunlocked(x)
□ Pre-commitreject(y); Server
fail
unlocked(x)
□ Post-commitfail(x) ; Serveridle(x)
Clientcheckout(x) = checkout.x→ (success.x→ Clientidle(x)□accessDenied.x→ failure.x→ Clientcheckout(x))
Clientupdate(x) = update.x→ (success.x→ Clientidle(x)
□AccessDenied(x);Clientupdate(x))
□upToDate.x→ success.x→ Clientidle(x))
Clientcommit(x) = commit.x→ (success.x→ Clientidle(x)
□accessDenied.x→ failure.x→ Clientidle(x))
□needToUpdate.x→ failure.x→ Clientupdate(x))
□policyViolated.x→ failure.x→ Clientupdate(x))
□otherCommitUnderExecution.x→ failure.x→ Clientupdate(x))
Clientidle(x) = Clientcommit(x)□Clientupdate(x)
SyncEvents = {|commit,update,checkout,accessDenied,policyViolated,needToUpdate,failure,success|}
Server = Serveridle()
Clients = ||| y : Range @ Clientcheckout(y)
Collaboration = Server ||SyncEvents Clients
